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INTRODUCTION 
In the complex, highly regulated world in which business corporations 
operate, corporate general counsel play a key role in promoting organizational 
integrity and ethical lawyering.  The fiduciary and professional responsibilities 
of the general counsel1—or chief legal officer2—are explicit in the rules 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to 
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.3  They are also implicit in the 
August 2003 amendments to Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.134 
adopted by the American Bar Association’s (ABA) House of Delegates5 
pursuant to the recommendations of the ABA Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility.6  The real power and potential influence of the men and women 
 
 1. While outside lawyers or law firms sometimes serve as general counsel to entities or 
their components, for purposes of this discussion the term “general counsel” refers to a lawyer 
employed by a corporation or other organization to serve as its chief legal officer with 
responsibility for overseeing legal matters pertaining to the entity, including its governance, 
finance, and operations. 
 2. The term “chief legal officer,” customarily abbreviated “CLO,” is employed in some 
organizations in lieu of the term “general counsel” because it is comparable to the terminology 
used for other executive functions, such as “chief executive officer,”  “chief financial officer,” 
“chief operating officer,” etc.  “Chief legal officer” is also the terminology used by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in its Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 
Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 
205 (2003). 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).  In section 307 Congress directed the 
SEC to issue rules: 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including a 
rule— 
  (1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law 
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to 
the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent 
thereof); and 
  (2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, 
as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), 
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of 
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely 
of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors. 
Id. at § 307; 15 U.S.C. 7245 (2000 & Supp. II). 
 4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13 (2003). 
 5. See ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTIONS OF THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
(Aug. 11–12, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/corpgov.pdf [hereinafter AUGUST 
2003 ABA RESOLUTIONS]. 
 6. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE 
REPORT].  While the impetus for the SEC’s Part 205 rules, much of the work of the ABA Task 
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who serve as corporate general counsel, however, goes far beyond the areas 
touched upon by these mandates.  Enron and other corporate debacles illustrate 
all too well what happens when business managers fail to understand and 
honor their responsibilities.  As advisors and liaisons to senior corporate 
officers, directors, boards, and board committees, general counsel have a great 
deal to do with the way business managers perceive both their particular legal 
obligations and corporate responsibility in general.7  General counsel are 
ideally situated to serve as leaders in the struggle to define the parameters of 
corporate conscience.  They can and should be held accountable for promoting 
integrity on the part of corporations and their constituents and for fostering 
professional responsibility on the part of corporate lawyers. 
Despite the vital importance of general counsel in the corporate arena, a 
great deal remains to be explored about the nature of the office and the part 
general counsel will play in the emerging ethical landscape.8  The purpose of 
 
Force on Corporate Responsibility, and the August 2003 amendments to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, arose primarily out of concerns over the role of lawyers representing public 
corporations, many other entities, including those in the not-for-profit sector, are subject to 
similar concerns.  These concerns merit inclusion in work on reporting up and reporting out 
requirements, even though only issuers registered under federal securities laws are subject to the 
relevant SEC rules.  See, e.g., Susan Hackett, It’s Private Companies’ Turn to Dance the Sarbox 
Shuffle (Am. Corporate Counsel Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2003, available at 
http://www.acca.com/public/article/corpresp/sarbox_shuffle.pdf.  While the principal focus of this 
article is on general counsel in public corporations, much of the discussion also applies to general 
counsel employed by private business entities and not-for-profit organizations. 
 7. In addition to the challenges presented by the new regulatory measures, the renewed 
focus on legal compliance and corporate governance issues offers opportunities for corporate 
lawyers, particularly for general counsel, to raise attention to legal issues.  “General counsel are 
both legal officers and corporate officers.  Most of the time, General Counsel have to balance 
their legal roles and their business roles.  Sarbanes-Oxley is a profound exception to this need for 
balance in the sense that, by rigorously applying their legal insight, general Counsel directly serve 
economic business objectives.”  Lawrence J. Stybel & Maryanne Peabody, A New Balance of 
Power Means New Boardroom Opportunity for General Counsel, OF COUNS., May 2004, at 9, 
10. 
 8. There are, however, a few excellent recent articles.  See, e.g., Deborah DeMott, The 
Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955 (2006); Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look 
at the Role of Corporate Counsel: Back to the Future—Or is it the Past?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 
621–28 (2002) [hereinafter Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel]; E. Norman Veasey 
& Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the 
Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1 (2006).  The ethical obligations of chief legal 
officers were also discussed in the Section on Professional Responsibility panel on “Navigating 
Treacherous Waters: Initiating an Investigation, Going Up the Ladder and Reporting Out” at the 
American Association of Law Schools January 2007 meeting in Washington, D.C., and a number 
of thoughtful articles were written a decade ago in connection with Emory University Law 
School’s 1997 Randolph Thrower Symposium on the Role of the General Counsel.  See, e.g., 
Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1997); Richard S. Gruner, 
General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY 
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this article is to offer an overview of the role of contemporary general counsel, 
with a particular focus on the specific responsibilities assigned to these 
individuals as chief legal officers pursuant to the SEC’s Part 205 rules and 
implicit in Model Rule 1.13.  The discussion emphasizes three points.  First, 
corporate general counsel play multifaceted roles in the corporate legal 
environment, and their influence extends across a vast spectrum of corporate 
activity.  Consequently, the ability of general counsel to perform their 
functions successfully in the new ethical landscape will significantly impact 
the effectiveness of regulatory efforts designed to promote corporate integrity 
and professional responsibility. 
Second, the article suggests that it is not only what general counsel do that 
matters, but also how they do it.  Corporate lawyers constantly face pressure to 
compromise professional judgment and abandon internal moral standards in 
the interest of fitting into business environments.  They are urged to be team 
players in a game where winning depends on wealth maximization—corporate 
and individual.  Measures designed to require ethical vigilance on the part of 
general counsel need to support broader values and empower general counsel 
to act as “lawyer statesmen”9 who offer insights that go beyond technical legal 
advice. 
Third, given the importance of the general counsel function, in evaluating 
the efficacy of the rules governing corporate legal practice scholars, 
practitioners and regulators need to recognize the significance of the role of 
corporate general counsel and consider the impact of new legal rules and the 
practices they engender on those charged with so much of the responsibility for 
making these rules work. 
 
L.J. 1113 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1011 (1997) [hereinafter Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas]; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Three 
Afterthoughts, 46 EMORY L.J. 1053 (1997) [hereinafter Hazard, Three Afterthoughts]; James F. 
Kelley, The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1197 (1997); Carl D. Liggio, The 
Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1201–02 (1997) [hereinafter Liggio, 
The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel]; Howard B. Miller, Law Risk Management and the 
General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1223 (1997); Timothy P. Terrell, Professionalism as Trust: The 
Unique Internal Legal Role of the Corporate General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1997); Sally 
R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1023 (1997). 
 9. See Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., The Ideal of the ‘Lawyer Statesman’, 22 ACC DOCKET 
62, 64 (May 2004) (stating that general counsel “must have enough life experience, stature, and 
self-confidence to express honest, complex views even under the inevitable pressure for simple, 
short-term answers”); Face Value: Where’s the Lawyer?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2004, at 73 
(discussing former General Electric Company General Counsel Benjamin Heineman’s view that 
an ideal general counsel is a “lawyer statesman” who “should be involved in everything from 
creating a ‘culture of compliance and integrity’ to engaging in public debate and fighting the 
current cynicism about business”). 
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Part I begins with an overview of the history of the corporate general 
counsel position and then outlines formal and informal roles contemporary 
general counsel play, concluding with a discussion of the importance of a 
broad vision of the role in fostering corporate integrity and professional ethics.  
Part II looks at the responsibilities of general counsel in connection with 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the 2003 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
In the interest of beginning a conversation, Part III focuses on two of the 
many areas that merit careful consideration concerning the role of general 
counsel in the struggle to promote corporate integrity and professional 
responsibility.  The first section advocates caution with respect to the 
increasingly popular practice of retaining separate “independent” counsel to 
handle various corporate legal matters.  It is clearly necessary for corporate 
boards to retain separate counsel in certain limited circumstances—e.g., in 
connection with special litigation committee decisions in shareholder 
derivative actions or internal investigations involving allegations of 
misconduct that implicates the general counsel.  Overuse of this device, 
however, wastes resources, and, more importantly, threatens to undermine the 
authority and effectiveness of general counsel.  Consequently, the article 
suggests consideration of an ethical rule pertaining to coordination of counsel 
absent extraordinary circumstances. 
The second and final section of Part III turns to the critical need for 
ongoing attention to the relationship between general counsel and corporate 
directors.  Lawyers and business managers alike need standards applicable to 
the intersection of their roles, both as a basis for guidance and as a source of 
authority to invoke as a bulwark against countervailing pressures that assault 
integrity and professionalism.10  Accordingly, standards pertaining to general 
counsel attendance at board meetings and ongoing communication with 
independent directors have a great deal of merit.  In addition, this article 
proposes a standard requiring chief legal officers to report to directors on the 
resignation or termination of in-house lawyers or outside counsel handling 
significant matters for a company and the reasons therefore. 
 
 10. Cf. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 21 (observing that new up-ladder reporting 
requirements “provide counsel with leverage to cause . . . corporate constituents to ‘do the right 
thing’”). 
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I.  THE GENERAL COUNSEL IN CONTEMPORARY ENTITIES 
The office of general counsel is an exciting and much sought-after position 
in the contemporary legal market.11  General counsel function in the midst of 
the crossroads where business objectives, corporate governance standards, and 
rules of professional responsibility intersect.  The following discussion briefly 
looks at some of the major historical trends that have defined the nature of the 
position and then turns to the role of general counsel in contemporary 
entities.12 
A. Historical Trends in the Role of General Counsel 
Over time, the star of in-house lawyers in corporate entities has risen and 
fallen.  As noted legal historian Lawrence Friedman reports, in the second half 
of the nineteenth century— the time period when the corporate form became a 
hallmark of big business in the United States13 —corporate legal jobs were 
highly desirable.14  “To be general counsel of a major railroad, after the Civil 
War, was to occupy a position of great prestige and enormous salary.”15  The 
potential rewards inspired many of the bar’s best and brightest, including 
judges, to seek general counsel positions.16 
Prestige and power continued to be associated with corporate counsel 
positions well into the twentieth century.  Many senior corporate managers 
began their careers as in-house lawyers during this “golden age of corporate 
counsel.”17  Gradually, however, business school graduates took over the 
leadership of corporate America.18  At a time when both the regulatory 
environment and financial transactions were significantly less complex than 
 
 11. See, e.g., Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 632 & n.28; 
Janet Stidman Eveleth, Life as Corporate Counsel, 37 MD. B.J. 16, 18 (Jan.-Feb. 2004) (stating 
that “over the last 20 years, the role of general counsel has emerged as a popular area of 
practice”). 
 12. In recent years the role of general counsel has become increasingly important in many 
different kinds of entities.  Even large law firms now have general counsel.  See Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., “Lawyer for Lawyers”: The Emerging Role of Law Firm Legal Counsel, 53 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 795, 795 (2005). 
 13. See Sarah H. Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: 
The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 220–21 (2006). 
 14. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (3d ed. 2005). 
 15. Id.; see also, e.g., DeMott, supra note 8, at 958–59; Liggio, A Look at the Role of 
Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 621–22; Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 
supra note 8, at 1201–02. 
 16. DeMott, supra note 8, at 958–59. 
 17. Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 621 (observing that 
during the first decades of the twentieth century, “75% of the CEOs of the major companies were 
lawyers compared to less than 5% today”); see also Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate 
Counsel, supra note 8, at 1202. 
 18. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1202. 
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today, few senior managers perceived the need to devote corporate resources to 
law departments.19  In-house positions became less desirable as compensation 
lagged and advancement opportunities steadily decreased.20  As business 
managers turned to outside lawyers for legal advice, the prestige of in-house 
positions plummeted.21  In the 1970s, however, the tide began to turn,22 and in-
house lawyers once again emerged as significant players in the corporate 
world.23  As the practice environment evolved, the importance of general 
counsel within corporate structures became clear. 
B. Emergence of the Contemporary Model 
The ascendancy of the corporate law department during the last three 
decades resulted from the confluence of a variety of factors.24  Professor 
Geoffrey Hazard notes that businesses experienced an increasing need for 
“continuous legal assistance, readily at hand and already familiar with the 
 
 19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 490; see also Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate 
Counsel, supra note 8, at 623 (“Compared to today, the 1950s and early 1960s were the land of 
legal simplicity.”). 
 20. See Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 622–23; Liggio, 
The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1202–03.  During this time period “the 
term ‘house counsel’ was one of double disparagement.”  Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 
8, at 1011.  As Professor Regan points out, it was also during the first decades of the twentieth 
century that the “Cravath approach” sparked the development of the elite Wall Street firms that 
dominated corporate legal work for many years by providing high quality services to corporate 
clients, albeit at a high cost.  MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A 
WALL STREET LAWYER 23 (2004). 
 21. See Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 622 (noting tht 
“few companies had internal legal departments”).  Mr. Liggio also notes that the resources 
necessary to support an adequate legal library, particularly the cost of the books themselves, 
reinforced the role of large law firm lawyers as “gatekeepers of legal knowledge.”  Id. at 625.  He 
cites the rapid development of technology during the last few decades as a tremendous leveling 
influence with respect to access to legal knowledge.  Id. at 633–34. 
 22. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes wrote an influential article describing this trend in 
1985.  See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985).  They noted: 
  A striking development in the legal profession over the last decade has been the rapid 
growth in both importance and size of the in-house, or corporate counsel.  The traditional 
house counsel was a relatively minor management figure, stereotypically, a lawyer from 
the corporation’s principal outside law firm who had not quite made the grade as 
partner. . . . The new breed of general counsel has left this stereotype behind. 
Id. at 277 n.1. 
 23. As Chayes and Chayes noted in 1985, the shift to in-house legal departments was “most 
pronounced among the largest corporations in the American economy . . . those that [had] 
traditionally been the anchor clients of the large, elite law firms.”  Id. at 278. 
 24. As Professor DeMott has observed, this renaissance resulted from both demand and 
supply side factors.  DeMott, supra note 8, at 961. 
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corporation’s operations and legal environment.”25  As former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist observed in Upjohn Co. v. United States,26 “corporations, unlike 
most individuals, ‘constantly [needed to] go to lawyers to find out how to obey 
the law’”;27 by the early 1980s, corporate legal compliance was “hardly an 
instinctive matter.”28  At the time of the Upjohn decision, SEC and Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement initiatives pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act29 were in full swing, the Watergate scandal had opened the eyes 
of law enforcement authorities and the public to questionable domestic 
political contributions by major corporations and their constituents,30 and a 
burst of legislative activity had given birth to comprehensive regulatory 
systems applicable to corporate actors.31  This was also the era of the litigation 
explosion.  The number of civil actions against corporations dramatically 
increased in areas ranging from employment to products liability,32 and class 
actions and shareholders’ derivative suits emerged as effective weapons 
against powerful corporate behemoths.33  Corporate managers learned from 
experience, and they, too, began to use litigation as an offensive weapon to 
pursue business objectives and as a defensive tool to combat hostile takeover 
attempts.34 
At the same time, external economic factors made law firm representation 
increasingly expensive.35  Familiarizing outside counsel with the details 
 
 25. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1012; see also Liggio, The Changing Role of 
Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1210 (noting the numerous functional roles of corporate 
counsel). 
 26. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 27. Id. at 392. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
 30. See generally Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, 
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COL. BUS. L. REV. 859, 872–73 (citing 
STEPHEN F. BLACK, INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS § 1.01 at 1-1 (1998), and Arthur F. 
Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 655–56 (1984)). 
 31. See Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1204 (noting 
growth of “‘alphabet soup’ agencies” and passage of several comprehensive new laws).  See 
generally Duggin, supra note 30, at 881–83. 
 32. See Duggin supra note 30, at 881–83; Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 
supra note 8, at 1203.  See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT 
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). 
 33. Duggin, supra note 30, at 881–83. 
 34. Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in 
Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 199–200 (2001) (discussing the recent increase 
in the number of in-house attorneys and the corresponding benefits to corporations); Liggio, A 
Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 624; Liggio, The Changing Role of 
Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1203. 
 35. Daly, supra note 8, at 1060 (“As the legal fees charged by law firms continued to rise, 
both corporate financial officers and general counsel perceived the fiscal and professional 
wisdom of making salaried lawyers responsible for the delivery of nonroutine, complex legal 
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necessary to effective representation required large cash outlays36 and diverted 
human resources from more economically productive business tasks.  As legal 
fees became a larger part of corporate expenditures, managers also clamored 
for utilization of business-oriented approaches to contain rapidly expanding 
legal risks and concomitant counsel fees.37  Perhaps most importantly, many 
corporate managers began to recognize, albeit sometimes grudgingly, the 
usefulness of involving lawyers early on in business initiatives.38 
During the same time period, lawyers, too, were beginning to see the 
promising possibilities of in-house positions.  As law firms demanded longer 
and longer workdays, lawyers looking for ways to escape the tyranny of the 
billable hour and the pressure to become rainmakers39 were attracted to in-
house positions.40  This trend accelerated as compensation and benefit 
packages became increasingly lucrative41 and the “affirmative self-assurance 
of corporate counsel [was] manifested in their own organizations, publications 
and special identity.”42  The creation of the American Corporate Counsel 
 
services, particularly those of a transactional character.”); Liggio, The Changing Role of 
Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1204–05 (noting that “[e]scalating costs, coupled with a 
distaste for lawyers generally, were a critical catalyst in propelling employed counsel into the 
forefront of the modern corporate hierarchy,” and that many corporate executives believed that 
outside counsel overcharged for their services). 
 36. See Daly, supra note 8, at 1060–61; see also Kim, supra note 34, at 199–200. 
 37. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1206 (stating that 
“the business of the law is being addressed by a new breed of corporate counsel who are applying 
business techniques and tools to management of the legal process”) (citing Howard B. Miller, 
Law Risk Management and General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1223 (1997)); see also id. at 1204–
05 (noting 1980s survey results reflecting high percentage of corporate executives who believed 
outside law firms overcharged their companies). 
 38. Kim, supra note 34, at 202–03. 
 39. See, e.g., Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 628. 
 40. See generally Eveleth, supra note 11, at 18 (citing reports of more flexible hours, no 
need to bill time or compete to bring in clients, and better benefit packages as attractions of in-
house counsel positions); Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1012 (noting the “growth of 
the large law firm, where the working environment for the average lawyer is not much different 
from, and often is worse than, that in corporate law departments” as one of several key factors); 
Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 628.  Professor DeMott 
discusses four hypotheses that may explain why general counsel positions have become far more 
attractive to members of the legal profession in recent years.  DeMott, supra note 8, at 961.  
These hypotheses include (1) the “fit” between ability and position demands, (2) perceptions of 
in-house counsel positions as “launching pads” for transitions to other senior management 
positions, (3) increasing economic rewards, and (4) the contrast between the work experiences of 
law firm attorneys and their in-house counterparts.  Id. 
 41. Eveleth, supra note 11, at 18; Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra 
note 8, at 627–28; Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1206. 
 42. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1012. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 999 
Association43 in 1982 by a group of prominent general counsel evidenced this 
phenomenon.44  Further, in an environment of increasing specialization, 
“employment by a single client bec[ame] simply another form of 
specialization.”45 
As companies began to hire lawyers and law firms for particular projects 
rather than affiliating with a few firms for nearly all of their work,46 outside 
counsel “tend[ed] to become an executor of the general counsel’s instructions, 
with decreasing scope for originality or independent judgment.”47  This 
phenomenon made in-house positions even more desirable for lawyers 
interested in opportunities to influence organizational behavior from the inside, 
rather than working as hired guns lining up for another shootout.48  It is 
possible that the changing demographics of the legal profession—particularly 
the entry of large numbers of women and minority lawyers into the profession 
beginning in the 1960s—also made a difference.49  In any event, as lawyers’ 
 
 43. The Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC), originally called the American Corporate 
Counsel Association (ACCA), was formed on March 14, 1982.  Liggio, The Changing Role of 
Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1211.  The principal founders were Carl Liggio of Ernst & 
Young, Robert Banks of Xerox Corporation, and S.T. Jack Brigham III of Hewlett-Packard.  
Daly, supra note 8, at 1063.  The organization began with fifty members, Liggio, The Changing 
Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1211, but it now serves more than 20,000 members 
working in sixty-eight countries for more than 8,800 corporations, including all of the Fortune 
100 companies and seventy-four of the Global 100 companies.  Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, 
About ACC, http://www.acc.com/php/cms/index.php?id=28 (last visited June 25, 2007). 
 44. See Daly, supra note 8, at 1063 (“They were determined to alter a perceived long-
standing misallocation of power between legal departments and law firms in which in-house 
lawyers exercised little oversight or control over the outside attorneys whom they retained.”); see 
also Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1211. 
 45. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1012. 
 46. See, e.g., Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8 (describing 
retention of outside counsel as “increasingly episodic”); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate 
Norms and Contemporary Law Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 933–40 (2002) (suggesting 
that expansion of in-house law departments and concomitant retention of outside counsel on a 
task basis rather than general retainer has had a major impact on large law firms and their 
lawyers). 
 47. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 298.  In recent years, a number of corporations have 
sought to reduce the number of law firms handling their work as a means of lessening the 
managerial burden on in-house counsel and obtaining more favorable billing arrangements.  See, 
e.g., Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-House 
Profession, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 614 (2002).  A return to the days of utilizing one or a few firms 
for the bulk of a corporation’s legal work is unlikely, however, given the complexity of 
contemporary corporate entities and the impact of globalization. 
 48. See id. at 294; Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1209. 
 49. The impact of the dramatic increase in the number of women in the legal profession 
during the last part of the twentieth century on the evolution of in-house counsel positions 
remains to be explored.  Legal historian Lawrence Friedman notes that women were 
rare beasts in the bar until the 1960s.  Then the tide turned, and dramatically.  By the end 
of the century, about a quarter of the bar was made up of women, most of them rather 
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perceptions of successful career paths evolved,50 members of the profession 
began to understand the potential power and influence of in-house counsel in 
the business world.51 
During the latter part of the twentieth century, corporations themselves 
were also becoming increasingly integral to the economic, social, and political 
life of ordinary Americans.  In 1900 fewer than one percent of Americans held 
corporate stock, and in 1980 only thirteen percent were shareholders.52  By 
1998, however, more than fifty-two percent of Americans owned shares in 
corporations in one form or another.53  The media chronicled daily the parts 
major business entities and their leaders played—not only in the nation’s 
economic life, but in politics, philanthropic endeavors, and social arenas.  A 
number of corporate executives even became well-known celebrities.54  The 
increasing prominence of corporations and their leaders in society undoubtedly 
further enhanced the allure of in-house legal positions. 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, in-house opportunities, 
particularly general counsel and deputy general counsel positions, had become 
extremely competitive for lawyers at all professional levels.  Law firm 
partners, government officials, and, once again, even judges joined the ranks of 
corporate general counsel.55  Ironically, law firms even began to create their 
 
young; and there were so many women in the pipeline—half or more of the law students 
in many schools—that the percentage of women lawyers was bound to rise, perhaps to 
majority status in the twenty-first century. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 538.  Professor Friedman also notes a significant increase in the 
number of lawyers from racial and ethnic minority groups over the same time period.  Id.; see 
also Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 628 & n.22 (citing AM. 
CORP. COUNS. ASS’N, AMERICAN CORPORATE COUNSEL ASSOCIATION’S CENSUS OF IN-HOUSE 
COUNSEL: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Dec. 2001) (noting demographic changes and paucity of 
relevant information)).  Still, however, ACC reports that in its 2006 member survey, 89% of 
respondents identified themselves as Caucasian and approximately two-thirds as male.  See ACC 
2006 Census of In-house Counsel, www.acc.com/resource/v8360 (last visited June 25, 2007). 
 50. See DeMott, supra note 8, at 960–61 & supra note 40. 
 51. See Kim, supra note 34, at 200–01; Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, 
supra note 8, at 629; Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1205. 
 52. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 13, at 214 n.9 (citing THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., 
THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900–2000 
252–53 (2001), and U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2006, available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/income.pdf (follow “Table 655” link)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant & Shelby White, Personal Business; How the Other Half 
Gives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at § 3, at 1 (describing attitudes of Bill Gates, Ted Turner, and 
other celebrities toward philanthropy); Randy Kennedy, When Scraping the Sky Makes a City 
Bleed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at B1 (discussing Donald Trump and his plans for new 
buildings); Who Did the Best Job?, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 91 (examining the accomplishments 
of Jack Welch and other well known executives). 
 55. For example, in 2005, Sven Holmes, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma, left the federal bench to become vice chairman for legal 
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own internal general counsel positions.56  As a result of this dramatic shift, 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century, “[g]eneral counsel, not law 
firm partners [became] the ‘statesmen’ to chief executive officers (CEOs), 
confidently offering business as well as legal advice.”57 
C. The Multifaceted Roles of Contemporary General Counsel 
In a heavily regulated, litigious world, the way in which entities deal with 
legal issues is critical to their survival and success, whether they are global 
corporations, local charities, or government agencies.  Although empirical 
evidence is limited,58 it is apparent that the influence of in-house counsel 
generally has grown as the significance of legal considerations has escalated in 
the strategic planning process.59  In 1985 Professors Abram and Antonia 
Chayes concluded that “the general counsel has a personal role in defining 
alternatives, in strategic decisions, and even in tactical choices.”60  More 
recently, Professor Deborah DeMott suggested that, because his or her 
influence “may extend well beyond the bare bones of ensuring legal 
compliance,”61 a corporate general counsel “may be uniquely well positioned 
 
affairs of KPMG, Inc.  Lynnley Browning, Openers: Suits, Here Comes the Judge, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2005, §3, at 2; Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters, KPMG Hires Federal Judge, 
WASH. POST., Jan. 21, 2005, at E1; see also DeMott, supra note 8, at 962 n.33.  Other companies 
have successfully sought out former government officials, and even prosecutors, to serve as 
general counsel or in other senior in-house positions.  See, e.g., Emma Schwartz, From Public to 
Private Employment: Companies Seek Exiting Government Lawyers for Hire, LEGAL TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2005; Joseph A. Slobodzian, GCs for Tough Times: Companies Are Hiring Attorneys 
Who Have Been Prosecutors, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 5, 2002, available at www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1038966824667. 
 56. See generally Terry Carter, Taking a Cue from the Corporate World, Law Firms Create 
Internal General Counsel Jobs, ABA J., Aug. 2006, at 30; Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. 
Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance 
Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002); Hazard, supra note 12. 
 57. Daly, supra note 8, at 679. 
 58. The situation regarding general counsel today is little different from that in 1985 when 
Abram and Antonia Chayes noted that the empirical basis for analyses of the role of in-house 
counsel amounted to “little better than informed speculation.”  Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, 
at 299; see also DeMott, supra note 8, at 957 (“Scholars using sophisticated social science 
methodologies have yet to investigate the environment and performance of general counsel to the 
extent that social scientists have explored law firms and relationships between clients and external 
counsel.”).  The ACC has perhaps the best compilation of information on the general counsel 
function in its “Virtual Library,” which is available to members and with permission through the 
ACC website, http://www.acc.com. 
 59. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 281–83; DeMott, supra note 8, at 960; 
Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1209. 
 60. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 298. 
 61. DeMott, supra note 8, at 955 (pointing out that general counsel’s roles are “complex and 
interlinked”). 
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to champion a transformation of the organizational culture that shapes how the 
corporation addresses its relationships with law and regulation.”62 
Commentators who have addressed the emerging contours of the general 
counsel function have described its component duties in terms of functional 
categories.63  The following discussion takes a slightly different tack.  It begins 
by delineating “formal” and “informal” responsibilities and then breaks down 
these functions into component parts.  The purpose is to illustrate both the 
wide variety of the roles of contemporary general counsel and the many stages 
on which they play them.64  Both formal and informal roles are important.  
While the formal tasks constitute the official responsibilities of general 
counsel, the ways in which general counsel operate informally—i.e., behind 
the scenes—can exert a great deal of influence on the attitudes of managers 
and employees toward lawyers and legal obligations. 
1. Formal Functions 
For purposes of this discussion, “formal” describes the kinds of tasks one 
might expect to find articulated in a general counsel’s job description, as well 
as other responsibilities typically associated with the position.  Many aspects 
 
 62. Id. at 955–56.  Professor DeMott also notes, however, that “[w]hile a lawyer who serves 
as general counsel of a large corporation holds the clearly defined power associated with a 
hierarchical position in a large bureaucratic organization, the position itself is ambiguous in many 
ways that may prove troubling.”  Id. at 957; see, e.g., Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 
1012 (noting that “clarity of the role does not necessarily imply clarity in ethical 
responsibilities”).  Professor DeMott suggests that the tensions inherent in the general counsel 
position are often difficult to resolve, particularly when ethical demands require a general counsel 
to maintain professional independence from the entity he or she serves.  See id. at 981; see also, 
e.g., Sara A. Biro, Martine Petetin & Anthony E. Wales, Identity Crisis: Managing a Legal vs. 
Business Role, ACC EUROPE, 2005, at 10, available at http://www.acca.com/resource/ 
index.php?key=7214 (noting that “[a] modern in-house lawyer expects to cope with paradoxes, 
inconsistencies and changing scenarios arising in a business . . . and needs to wear a different hat 
at different times”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing tensions inherent in 
general counsel’s relationships with other corporate agents). 
 63. See, e.g., JULIE A. BELL ET AL., IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AS MULTI-DISCIPLINARIAN 4, 
available at www.acca.com/resource/v6922 (describing “[e]xpanding [r]ings of [r]esponsibility” 
ranging from traditional responsibilities to “the convergence of management of compliance, risk 
and legal affairs—the ‘Chief Risk Officer’”); Daly, supra note 8, at 681(identifying typical roles 
as: barrister, solicitor, business advisor, and statesman); DeMott, supra note 8, at 957 (identifying 
four principal roles as: legal advisor, officer, administrator, and corporate agent); Veasey & Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing roles of “legal advisor,” “corporate officer and member 
of senior executive team,” “administrator of the in-house legal department,” and “corporate agent 
in dealings with third parties, including outside counsel”). 
 64. See Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Chair’s Forum: Wearing More Hats Than a Hydra Has 
Heads—In-House Practitioners in Today’s Corporate Environment . . . Anticipating the 
Challenges and Meeting the Demands in Today’s Corporate Practice, Oct. 2004, available at 
http://www.acca.com/resource/v5570 (describing in-house counsel as lawyers “wearing more hats 
than a hydra has heads”). 
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of a general counsel’s work are those traditionally expected of lawyers.  
Others, described here as “quasi-legal” roles, encompass less traditional 
tasks—e.g., compliance monitoring.  These functions are often assigned to or 
undertaken by general counsel in response to evolving demands generated by 
regulation, litigation, and other changes in the milieu in which corporations 
operate.  Yet another type of formal function encompasses managerial duties 
and non-legal business responsibilities. 
a. Traditional Lawyering Roles 
i. Legal Advisor 
Perhaps the most widely recognized and far-reaching duty of contemporary 
general counsel is to provide legal advice to officers, directors, and other 
constituents acting on behalf of entities.  Typically, this advice spans a broad 
spectrum of issues ranging from internal matters such as corporate governance, 
to external affairs such as transactions, litigation, and regulatory issues.  In 
providing advice to entities and their constituents, general counsel have an 
obligation to know the business of their client entities intimately.65  General 
counsel are often the first lawyers to hear of matters requiring legal input and 
the last to sign off before proposed actions become a reality.66  In providing 
advice to the client, a general counsel “must be a futurist, a 
seer . . . us[ing] . . . legal foresight to discern trends in the law and to predict 
how those trends will impact the company’s business over time.”67 
In the course of their advice work, general counsel necessarily develop 
direct working relationships with senior managers.  The quality of these 
relationships almost certainly affects the influence a general counsel exerts 
over an entity and its business managers.  At the same time, there is an inherent 
danger that relationships that become too close may compromise the ability of 
general counsel to give objective legal advice, particularly when the advice 
appears to raise barriers to the accomplishment of business objectives.68  There 
 
 65. See Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1208; Irma S. 
Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers 
Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513, 517 (2003). 
 66. This is particularly true for the many general counsel who serve on corporate 
management or executive committees.  See infra Part I.C.l.c.iv.  General counsel are ultimately 
responsible to corporate boards, but ordinarily their line reporting relationships are with CEOs or 
other senior corporate managers.  See ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, ROLE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL 24 (2005), available at http://www.acca.com/resource/v6685; Hackett, supra note 46, 
at 614; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 10. 
 67. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1208. 
 68. See infra Part I.D.; Russell, supra note 65, at 517–18 (noting that inside counsel “should 
recognize the inherent tendency to identify with his corporate client and guard against loss of 
independence”); DeMott, supra note 8, at 967–68; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 8–11 
(discussing lawyer independence and related tensions); Weaver, supra note 8, at 1034 (observing 
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is evidence, however, that business managers realize the importance of seeking 
out candid legal advice in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment.  A number of 
businesses have hired former prosecutors and even judges for their top legal 
positions in efforts to achieve better legal compliance.69 
Part of the complexity of the role of legal advisor arises out of the general 
counsel’s obligation to provide advice to directors as well as to officers.  
Despite the trend toward retention of independent counsel to advise boards and 
board committees on particular matters,70 the general counsel is still the 
primary provider of legal advice to corporate boards and board committees as 
well as to the CEO and other senior corporate officers.  This dual reporting 
responsibility can create tensions in situations that require general counsel to 
advise against actions recommended by senior managers, or to report 
troublesome acts or omissions by officers.  The general counsel’s ultimate 
responsibility, however, is always to the client, and the highest authority 
capable of speaking on behalf of a corporate client is ordinarily its board of 
directors.71 
One of the principal areas in which general counsel provide advice is the 
corporate governance arena.  While they are not “gatekeepers” in the same 
sense as accountants who perform audits,72 general counsel often have the 
practical ability to change an entity’s direction by raising objections to a 
planned course of action.73  Even in the pre-Enron era, it took an unusually 
determined group of directors to vote to consummate a major transaction or 
proceed on other key matters when confronted with directly contrary advice by 
a company’s general counsel—particularly in situations in which the general 
counsel was instrumental in structuring a major transaction or obtaining the 
legal opinions necessary for it to proceed.  As Delaware’s former Chief Justice 
E. Norman Veasey notes, “The finest service that the corporate lawyer can 
perform for the board is to guide it toward the adoption and consistent 
 
that “Corporate counsel often acknowledge the increased effectiveness that they enjoy when 
senior management believes that they are ‘team players,’” but noting potential downsides to 
“team player” role). 
 69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 70. See infra Part III.A. 
 71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).  From a structural 
standpoint, general counsel ordinarily report to their company’s CEOs, but they necessarily have 
a parallel reporting obligation to the board of directors as the company’s highest authority.  See 
DeMott, supra note 8, at 34; Hackett, supra note 46, at 614; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 
8, at 8–9. 
 72. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.  See 
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1293 (2003); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 28–30. 
 73. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 281 (discussing general counsel’s “right and 
responsibility to insist upon early legal involvement in major transactions that raise significant 
legal issues”). 
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implementation of best practices that consistently ensure loyalty, good faith 
and due care” on the part of all constituents.74 
ii. Educator 
Another critical task of general counsel is to educate corporate 
constituents.75  General counsel serve as educators at the highest levels of their 
organizations and set in motion the programs designed to alert employees at all 
levels to their legal obligations.76  Education of client constituents is a core 
element of proactive lawyering77 in American corporations that “animates 
entire legal departments.”78  As the principal in-house legal advisor for the 
client, a general counsel has the responsibility to find ways to inform business 
managers and constituents throughout the company about what they can and 
cannot lawfully do as they pursue business objectives.79  This function is 
 
 74. E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent Directors: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1417 (2004). 
 75. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 284; Eveleth, supra note 11, at 18. 
 76. The part lawyers play in educating constituents of client organizations is too seldom 
emphasized in law school courses. 
 77. See Kim, supra note 34, at 202; see also, e.g., Robert J. Haft & Michele H. Hudson, 
Specific Due Diligence Standards Imposed by SEC and Professional Rules, in ROBERT J. HAFT, 
DUE DILIGENCE § 6:15 (2006) (citing Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 
Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing a holding where a corporate general 
counsel breached his duty to advise the board of its obligations with respect to management and 
evaluation of corporate officers)).  Dean Daly locates the origins of proactive lawyering early in 
American history.  She cites Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1831 account of observations that lawyers 
were the “American aristocracy,” “naturally called upon to occupy most of the public stations.”  
Daly, supra note 8, at 1068 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 357 
(Henry Reeve trans., 1862)).  Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes connected proactive 
lawyering with what they call “programmatic prevention,” an approach they believed could be 
effectively undertaken only by in-house lawyers.  See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 284. 
 78. Daly, supra note 8, at 1071; see also, e.g., id. at 1080 (observing that in global entities it 
is critical for U.S. lawyers to educate foreign constituents on proactive legal practice); John H. 
McGuckin, Jr., The Ethical Dilemma of the In-House Counsel, 25 L.A. LAW. 31 (2002) 
(discussing the proactive role of in-house counsel versus reactive position of outside counsel). 
 79. See Eveleth, supra note 11, at 18 (observing that, among other tasks, most general 
counsel “train and educate company employees on legal issues”); Kelley, supra note 8, at 1198 
(suggesting that the general counsel’s role in the compliance area is primarily to educate 
corporate managers).  During the last several years, many law firms, trade associations, and other 
groups have provided a great deal of information through internet sites.  See, e.g., Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher LLP, Gibson Dunn Sarbanes-Oxley Resource Center, http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
news/firm/detail/id/762/?pubItemId=6638 (last visited June 25, 2007); Jones Day, Jones Day 
Memorandum, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/ 
pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S2368 (last visited June 25, 2007).  It is unclear, however, whether and 
to what extent non-lawyer corporate constituents read these kinds of materials. 
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particularly important when major new legal obligations—e.g., those created 
by Sarbanes-Oxley80—come into existence. 
The educative responsibilities of general counsel, like those of all in-house 
lawyers, arise in a variety of settings.  As Professor Hazard has observed, in-
house lawyers are particularly well suited to acquire “back channel” 
information.81  Access to such information not only creates unique 
challenges,82 it offers important opportunities to engage proactively in 
identifying potential legal problems and educating constituents about relevant 
legal obligations.  In these and other circumstances, general counsel and staff 
members aware of potential problems arising in the conduct of daily corporate 
business and alert to out-of-the-ordinary events can engage in the kind of on-
the-spot client education that can prevent major legal problems.  In 1985 
Professors Abram and Antonia Chayes described educative efforts as 
components of “programmatic prevention.”83 Today, “programmatic 
prevention” efforts usually are encompassed in compliance programs, but 
client education remains an integral part of proactive lawyering in all areas. 
iii. Transactions Facilitator 
The daily life of a modern business includes mergers, acquisitions, sales of 
assets, spin-off businesses, joint ventures, acquisition and transfer of 
intellectual property, real estate deals, procurement of goods and services, and 
a host of other transactions.  These transactions often entail complex business 
structures and highly sophisticated financing arrangements with extensive legal 
consequences.84  “[A]s key advisers to senior management [general counsel] 
usually participate in the negotiation, structuring and documentation of the 
corporation’s significant business transactions.”85  As chief legal officers, they 
are responsible for managing inside lawyers and outside counsel working on 
transactions.86  It is also the general counsel’s role to advise directors whether 
shareholder approval is needed and, if so, what mechanisms will suffice to 
obtain the requisite approval. 
 
 80. See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties 
of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004). 
 81. See Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1019 (“To put the point bluntly, a lawyer 
in independent practice is sheltered from the informal, back-channel information that flows 
around the company water cooler.”); Weaver, supra note 8, at 1028. 
 82. See Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1018–19. 
 83. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 284. 
 84. For example, tax considerations, regulatory clearances, and governance issues are just a 
few of the myriad questions that often arise in the context of corporate transactions. 
 85. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20. 
 86. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 281, 289–90. 
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The existence of corporate law departments should promote early legal 
involvement in proposed transactions.87  While most business lawyers 
undoubtedly would like to be involved in significant transactions from their 
inception, simply having lawyers on hand does not necessarily produce this 
result.  Even within an entity, the extent to which lawyers have access to 
business planning information is a function of both corporate culture and the 
degree of trust managers have in the capabilities of their in-house lawyers.  
However, the ready availability of in-house counsel at least puts these lawyers 
in position to get involved at earlier stages of transactions than outside lawyers. 
iv. Advocate 
When it comes to advocacy work, general counsel captain both the 
defensive and offensive teams for their client entities and marshal the resources 
to respond to legal actions ranging from routine civil claims to criminal 
investigations.  To do so effectively, a general counsel must make predictions 
about the outcome of litigation and regulatory proceedings in many different 
jurisdictions.88  The general counsel must safeguard the entity’s interests and 
take steps to ensure that its lawyers adopt coherent and consistent stances in 
tribunals across the nation and throughout the world,89 while simultaneously 
managing the costs of advocacy responsibly from an institutional point of 
view.  In these endeavors, a general counsel bears responsibility for overseeing 
the ethical propriety of litigation on the entity’s behalf and for requiring 
responsible, professional behavior on the part of the lawyers who represent the 
company.90 
A general counsel’s advocacy function also includes the role of liaison 
with governmental authorities.  Many routine interactions between entity and 
government personnel take place without lawyers,91 but others—for example, 
in situations in which government approval may make or break a business 
activity—should involve counsel.  Participation of counsel is critical in those 
situations in which government actions may result in significant sanctions, 
especially when criminal proceedings are a risk.92 
 
 87. See id. at 281; DeMott, supra note 8, at 960–61; Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 
8, at 1019 (discussing availability of “back-channel information” to in-house counsel). 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 89. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.  See generally JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE 
COUNSEL GUIDELINES §§ 4:1–4:24 (2005); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 293–94. 
 90. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1–3.7, 8.4 (2003); see also ASS’N OF 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 15. 
 91. For example, routine discussions with customs officials, ordinary inspections by 
regulatory agencies, and many interactions in the environmental area all take place without a 
lawyer present. 
 92. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 6–7 (noting the government affairs role of 
some general counsel).  Cf. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 
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v. Investigator 
The valiant prosecutors and intrepid defense attorneys of novels, 
television, and the silver screen often succeed because of their uncanny ability 
to unearth the critical facts that save the day and ensure that justice is done.  
While the reality may be far less glamorous, finding and sorting out the 
relevant facts is a key ingredient of all legal representation.  When suspicions 
of significant problems with potentially serious legal consequences arise within 
organizations it is often the general counsel who persuades corporate 
constituents of the need to pursue the matter and initiates an internal 
investigation.  The general counsel determines whether the inquiry will be 
handled in-house or by an outside law firm, a decision that is far more nuanced 
than is often appreciated.  Key factors include ability to access information, an 
understanding of its significance in the context of the corporation’s business 
and operations, and preservation of attorney-client privilege and work product 
protections.  Even choosing among outside law firms requires thoughtful 
consideration.  Thorough investigation and candid advice are essential, but 
some investigators pursue their charges so aggressively that they are more 
likely to destroy a company than cure its ills.93  It is ordinarily the role of the 
general counsel to strike the necessary balance. 
When lawyers conduct internal investigations for the purpose of providing 
legal advice and preparing for anticipated litigation, corporations and other 
entities have an opportunity to invoke attorney-client privilege and work 
product protections to safeguard the confidentiality of investigative findings.94  
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2003) (suggesting that “the ethical rules for protecting the 
professional independence of the bar need to take into account the role of the legal profession as 
an independent bulwark between individuals or organizations and the political branches of 
government”). 
 93. See Letter from Board of Directors of the American Corporate Counsel Association to 
Johnathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s74502/acca040703.htm.  As the ACC has pointed out: 
CLO’s [chief legal officers] regularly voice their concern that outside counsel hired by [a 
board committee] might have little guidance or commitment to working sensitively and 
productively with managers to uncover and remedy allegations.  Such firms can 
mistakenly believe that their retention by a group of directors indicates a presumed 
hostility to any cooperation with or presumption of good faith behavior on the part of 
management.  In the pursuit of their mission to uncover evidence of the reported 
allegations, they may employ scorched-earth investigation tactics that could unnecessarily 
degrade employee morale and dignity, inappropriately disrupt the business of the 
organization, or permanently burn bridges to any future relationship between “surviving” 
managers and lawyers who seek to work cooperatively with them. 
Id.; see also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 31 (noting potential risks of initiating 
internal investigations). 
 94. See Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault 
Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1118 (2006); 
Duggin, supra note 30, at 892–93 and sources cited therein. 
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The United States Supreme Court confirmed the availability of these 
protections to corporations in Upjohn Co. v. United States95 in adjudicating a 
dispute over the confidentiality of the fruits of an internal investigation of 
potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act96 violations by Upjohn’s general 
counsel.97  Since then, the subject of corporate attorney-client and work 
product protections has sparked tremendous controversy, particularly in the 
context of federal prosecution of business entities and other organizations.98  
Nevertheless, because of the special skills lawyers bring to bear in 
investigating potential legal violations and the concomitant availability of 
attorney-client and work product protections, the role of initiating and 
supervising internal investigations has become a recognized responsibility of 
general counsel.99 
 
 95. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 96. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
 97. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386. 
 98. See generally Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Attorney-Client 
Privilege on the Business of Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301, 304–27 
(2006) (recounting struggle between the United States Department of Justice (U.S.D.O.J.) and 
other federal agencies with the ABA and an alliance of business associations and civil right 
groups over government insistence on corporate waiver of attorney-client and work product 
protections, because of the impact on  individuals as well as entities).  There were extensive 
ongoing protests over the policy embodied first in a memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
Eric Holder.  Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General on Bringing 
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.  The policy was later incorporated and 
made mandatory in a memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson.  
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Department 
Components, United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/ 
corporate_guidelines.htm.  The U.S.D.O.J. retreated to some extent with respect to the 
Department’s position on corporate waiver of these protections in response to the protests, 
Congressional inquiries, and a federal court decision excoriating the Department for its role in 
causing accounting powerhouse KPMG, Inc. to decline to advance counsel fees to executives 
unless they cooperated with prosecutors in a government investigation of the company.  United 
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Memorandum of Deputy Attorney 
General Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys on 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, Dec. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.  For discussion of the McNulty 
Memorandum and its impact, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New 
Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312–28 (2007); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 8, at 32–33; John K. Villa, The McNulty Memorandum: A Reversal in Practice or in 
Name Only?, 25 ACC DOCKET 90 (2007). 
 99. However, when the conduct of the general counsel or other senior lawyers is at issue or 
when there is a concern that problems may be pervasive among senior managers, it is clearly 
appropriate to call in independent counsel reporting directly to the board or a board committee.  
See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 30–33. 
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vi. Client Representative 
In addition to doing the kinds of work lawyers find most familiar on behalf 
of corporations, general counsel often sit on the other side of the table as the 
embodiment of their organizational client.  The role of client is not a part 
lawyers generally play.  Like any other role it presents a unique set of 
challenges.  As the client representative, a general counsel must focus on 
business objectives and other organizational goals, manage the costs of outside 
legal services in relation to their benefits, and ensure that the many different 
individual lawyers and law firms who represent the corporate client utilize 
strategies that make sense in terms of overall client objectives rather than 
focusing solely on particular cases or transactions.100 
b. Quasi-Legal Roles 
In recent years many general counsel have taken on new formal 
responsibilities consonant with the evolution of the legal environment in which 
corporations and other entities operate.101  These tasks require a combination 
of skills, including both legal acumen and managerial ability.  Two significant 
examples—compliance and ethics roles—are discussed below.102 
i. Compliance Officer 
Law enforcement actions against corporations and other entities were 
infrequent prior to the last few decades of the twentieth century.  The incidents 
that led to the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,103 the Watergate 
scandal,104 and a host of other events that took place during the tumultuous 
years of the late 1960s and 1970s, however, focused attention on the power of 
 
 100. Coordination is critical to large corporations, because it is all too easy for lawyers 
focused on success in discrete matters to pursue a strategy or take a position in litigation that may 
foreclose a different path in a more important matter.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., BELL ET AL., supra note 63, at 4; DeMott, supra note 8, at 961–62. 
 102. It is important to emphasize that ethical obligations apply to lawyers engaged in business 
activities and other extra-legal duties related to their representation of the client.  See VILLA, 
supra note 89, at § 3:3 (“To be safe, a lawyer who provides any legal services to the corporate 
client must assume that all of his conduct is governed by the ethical rules [of the legal 
profession].”).  See generally GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING §§ 17.7, 17.23, 17.24 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that in-house counsel are co-agents with 
entity managers and employees and “that in some situations an entity lawyer may have to exercise 
independent professional judgment to determine what is truly in the client’s best interest—setting 
aside, if need be, the views of other highly placed agents”).  For additional discussion of this 
point from the perspective of general counsel, see ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 
66, at 14–15. 
 103. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
 104. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 5.12 (2006) (discussing the impact of the Watergate scandal on public 
corporations). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 1011 
major corporations and the far-reaching consequences of corporate 
wrongdoing.105  In response, the SEC and the IRS, followed by the Department 
of Justice and several other federal agencies, began to pursue civil sanctions 
against corporations and other entities.106  Criminal prosecutions soon 
followed.107  In 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission’s publication 
of its Organizational Guidelines108 made it quite clear that corporations and 
other entities were likely to be scrutinized by law enforcement officials and 
subjected to criminal sanctions where appropriate.109 
As noted earlier,110 a general counsel’s responsibility for initiating 
compliance efforts and assisting corporations to develop resources and 
implement programs is an essential part of what Professors Abram and Antonia 
Chayes recognized in 1985 as “programmatic prevention.”111  A number of 
factors have contributed to the prominent place corporate compliance programs 
now occupy in corporate practice.  First and foremost, of course, is the 
opportunity to deter and, if deterrence fails, discover wrongdoing.112  Perhaps 
even more significant is the impact of the dramatic increase in civil 
enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions against corporations and their 
constituents that began in the late 1970s, and the importance of institutional 
compliance programs in persuading law enforcement officials not to prosecute, 
as well as the potential mitigating impact pursuant to the Organizational 
Guidelines.113 
In many corporations, the general counsel serves as chief compliance 
officer.114  In others, the compliance function is separate from the law 
department, and the role of the general counsel ranges from providing legal 
advice pertaining to compliance functions to hiring compliance officers and 
 
 105. See generally Duggin, supra note 30, at 871–74. 
 106. Id. at 871–73. 
 107. Id. at 874–75. 
 108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2007). 
 109. The number of corporations prosecuted by federal authorities increased dramatically 
during the 1980s, see Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on 
Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988–90, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 252 & n.12 (1991), 
and continued to increase steadily throughout the 1990s.  U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT 45 (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/ar00toc.htm. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 111. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 284–89; see also, e.g., Gruner, supra note 8, at 
1124–26, 1142–46, 1157–58 (discussing “crime prevention” and information components of 
compliance function). 
 112. See Gruner, supra note 8, at 1143–62. 
 113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 108, at § 8C2.5(g); see also 
Griffin, supra note 98, at 317–20; Gruner, supra note 8, at 1143–62. 
 114. A 2003 ACC survey reflected that a significant percentage of general counsel oversee 
risk management and compliance functions.  See ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, 
at 26; see also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 6. 
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briefing senior managers and directors on compliance matters.115  Whether or 
not the formal corporate compliance function reports directly to the general 
counsel,116 the general counsel and other in-house lawyers play a major role in 
ensuring legal compliance throughout the entity.  The “conception of the 
lawyer as a promoter of corporate compliance with law emanates from the 
basic values of the legal profession,”117 and it is a vital responsibility of 
contemporary general counsel. 
ii. Corporate Ethics Officer 
Many general counsel also have primary responsibility for resolving ethics 
issues relevant to corporate policies that go beyond legal compliance.  For 
example, general counsel are often key contributors to the development of 
business conduct codes and other corporate ethics standards—e.g., rules 
governing the acceptance of gifts and gratuities or use of corporate vehicles 
and other resources.118  Codes of conduct and business ethics policies require 
proactive education if they are to be effective.  Employees must be informed 
about ethical requirements relevant to their jobs, including internal grievance 
procedures, limitations on personal matters such as financial investments, 
nepotism issues, and rules pertaining to interactions with people and entities 
outside the company.119  In many corporations, the general counsel sets up a 
process for responding to ethics inquiries; acts as the ultimate arbiter of 
conflict-of-interest matters, questions involving business, and other ethics 
issues; and establishes procedures for notifying the company of ethics 
violations and disciplining errant constituents.  Even when another official 
performs this function with respect to employees, because of their stature 
within the entity general counsel often handle issues pertaining to directors and 
senior managers. 
c. Management and Other Extra-Legal Business Roles 
The third category of duties often formally assigned to general counsel 
encompasses managerial responsibilities and extra-legal business roles.  
Examples of these kinds of functions are described below. 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. There are a number of reasons to separate the two functions.  The most compelling is 
that, depending on how they are structured, attorney-client and work product protections often do 
not apply in the context of compliance programs. 
 117. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 118. See Gruner, supra note 8, at 1156–58; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 7 & n.14 
(citing Daly, supra note 8, at 1084). 
 119. See Gruner, supra note 8, at 1152–59 (exploring compliance function of general 
counsel); Regan, supra note 46, at 934 (discussing corporate internalization of dispute resolution 
processes in areas such as sexual harassment); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 7 & n.14 
(discussing role of general counsel as ethicist). 
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i. Manager of Law Department and Related Functions 
Whatever other duties they have, virtually all general counsel serve as 
senior managers of corporate legal departments.  They supervise financial and 
administrative functions and, most importantly, oversee the hiring and training 
of the in-house legal staff.  It is the general counsel who sets the tone for the 
law department and who is ultimately responsible for setting the standards that 
govern how in-house lawyers represent the corporate client and deal with its 
constituents.  As a department manager, the general counsel often has 
considerable leeway in establishing compensation and benefit packages for 
subordinate lawyers.  He or she is the principal advocate for lawyers and other 
law department personnel within the corporation, and his or her willingness to 
support staff inevitably has a major impact on the respect other constituents 
accord to members of the law department and the extent to which they value 
their input.  From an ethical standpoint, the general counsel is a supervisory 
attorney within the meaning of the SEC’s Part 205 rules and Model Rule 
5.1.120  As Professor Hazard noted a decade ago, a general counsel can 
profoundly affect the attitudes of in-house counsel by being open to talking 
with subordinates about “ethically troublesome situations . . . [and] taking 
responsibility for resolving” them.121 
Depending on the structure of the particular organization, the functions a 
general counsel supervises may include document retention, equal employment 
opportunity, disciplinary proceedings, intellectual property management, risk 
management, and a host of other matters related to quasi-legal organizational 
functions.  In many organizations the role of the law department is to oversee 
 
 120. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2003); MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(c) & 5.1 (2003).  
Rule 1.0(c) defines “firm” or “law firm” to include “lawyers employed in the legal department of 
a corporation or other organization.”  Id.  Rule 5.1 provides: 
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers 
possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in 
the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct 
involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in 
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other 
lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or 
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. 
Id. 
 121. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1022. 
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the provision of advice in these areas, but in other entities these functions 
report directly to the general counsel.122  In recent years, the position of law 
department manager also has included encouraging and supporting pro bono 
work and bar activities by corporate counsel.123 
ii. Manager of Outside Legal Resources 
As the organization’s chief legal officer, the general counsel oversees the 
retention and management of the outside lawyers and law firms engaged to 
represent the entity or to assist in legal matters.  The general counsel has a 
great deal to do with setting the tone for outside counsel relationships.124  
General counsel establish policies and practices that directly impact the terms 
and conditions of engagements, interactions with in-house lawyers and client 
constituents, billing practices, and many other aspects of the relationship of 
outside counsel to the client entity and its constituents.125  These policy-
making and oversight functions are particularly important in an era when few 
law firm lawyers are intimately familiar with client corporations.  As Professor 
DeMott observes, “[T]he diffusion of corporate work among multiple law 
firms limits the breadth of any one firm’s knowledge of the client, empowering 
general counsel in dealings with firms but reducing the capacity of any one 
firm to bring judgment to bear when more comprehensive insight into the 
corporation may be desirable.”126 
iii. Corporate Officer 
Many, perhaps most, general counsel are corporate officers.  Titles such as 
“vice president and general counsel” or “vice president, legal affairs” are 
common.  A high percentage of general counsel also hold the office of 
 
 122. According to a recent survey, employment/labor functions reported to 51.30% of general 
counsel surveyed, trademark and copyright functions to 75.4%, and patent functions to 42.1%. 
See ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 26 (citing ALTMAN WEIL, ASS’N OF 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, 2003 SURVEY OF LAW DEPARTMENT BENCHMARKS SURVEY (2003)).  
Risk management functions reported to 33.7% of those surveyed.  Id.; see also Veasey & Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 6–7 (describing roles of general counsel and noting that a number of 
general counsel also act as government affairs officers for their companies). 
 123. See Hackett, supra note 46, at 616–17; see also Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate 
Counsel, supra note 8, at 1211–13 (discussing the role of general counsel in encouraging lawyers 
to engage in bar activities). 
 124. DeMott, supra note 8, at 970.  Conversely, a general counsel’s decision to retain or 
terminate an outside lawyer as counsel for an important, ongoing engagement may make or break 
a lawyer’s career. 
 125. ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 32–34. 
 126. DeMott, supra note 8, at 972; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 294; Eveleth, 
supra note 11, at 20; supra note 100.  Depending on one’s perspective, the net result of such 
changes may or may not be of overall benefit to the corporate client.  See, e.g., Regan, supra note 
46, at 933–36. 
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corporate secretary.127  As vice presidents and secretaries, in addition to their 
professional obligations, general counsel owe fiduciary allegiance to the 
corporation as officers.128  In the performance of their duties, however, they 
may well be held to the ethical standards of conduct applicable to lawyers.129 
iv. Management Committee Member 
General counsel routinely sit on corporate management or executive 
committees.  In this capacity, they are part of an elite group whose members 
guide both significant day-to-day management decisions and long-range 
planning.  General counsel who function in this capacity have opportunities to 
learn about the operational issues and financial questions critical to client 
corporations.  They also have the stature to gain access to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and other members of a 
company’s senior management team.  Consequently, this role offers the 
opportunity to influence significant corporate decisions as they are formulated 
and implemented. 
v. Strategic Planner 
For public corporations the strategic planning process necessarily involves 
consideration of legal issues.130  Corporate initiatives may rise or fall on legal 
questions, and profits may depend heavily on tax consequences and other legal 
aspects of particular ventures or financing structures.  As Professor Irma 
Russell notes, “[G]oal-setting and the evaulation of goals in light of legal 
consequences . . . [is an] integral part” of the strategic planning process for 
major corporations.131  Both legal feasibility and risk levels are critical factors 
in the calculus of whether or not to proceed with new projects or redesign 
existing programs.132  Involvement in the strategic planning process therefore 
affords general counsel and the in-house lawyers they supervise a chance to 
help shape business initiatives to meet legal requirements. 
 
 127. One recent survey reported that 80.80% of general counsel also serve as corporate 
secretaries. See ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 26 (citing ALTMAN WEIL, 
ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, 2003 SURVEY OF LAW DEPARTMENT BENCHMARKS SURVEY 
(2003)); see also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 8, 18 (discussing dual roles as well as 
the need for coordination between general counsel and secretary in companies in which different 
individuals perform these functions). 
 128. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. CODE § 8.42 (2005). 
 129. See supra note 102. 
 130. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 282 (discussing formal participation of counsel 
in strategic planning); Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1209–
10; Russell, supra note 65, at 521–23. 
 131. Russell, supra note 65, at 522. 
 132. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1209 (discussing the 
role of general counsel in the corporate planning process). 
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vi. Director 
Some general counsel serve as corporate directors for the entities that 
employ them.133  Service as a director of a client corporation, however, is 
“[a]mong the most controversial of the legal/business activities that U.S. 
lawyers undertake”134 because lawyer-directors must navigate an ethical 
minefield.135  A general counsel can bring a great deal of insight to a corporate 
board as a result of his or her intimate familiarity with the organization and 
sensitivity to the legal ramifications of business matters.  At the same time, a 
general counsel who serves as a director risks losing the independent judgment 
that makes counsel valuable to the entity and becoming entangled in conflicts 
between the role of legal advisor and corporate decision maker.136  The ability 
of the board to invoke the attorney-client privilege in seeking legal advice from 
the general counsel is also imperiled when the general counsel is a director.137  
In a 1998 formal opinion pertaining to the dual role of counsel and director, the 
ABA declined to prohibit lawyers from serving on the boards of client 
corporations.138  The opinion, however, cautioned of the hazards of this role 
and the potential need to resign from the board and/or withdraw from the 
representation in the event of a conflict of interest.139  General counsel are 
especially vulnerable to these ethical traps because their primary responsibility 
is to serve as their corporations’ chief legal officers. 
2. Informal Roles of General Counsel 
One of the reasons that general counsel can be so influential in 
organizations is that, in addition to fulfilling their formal or official duties, they 
frequently play a variety of informal parts that have a less visible but 
 
 133. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-410 (1998); ASS’N 
OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 15; VILLA, supra note 89, at § 3.32; Kim, supra note 
34, at 182. 
 134. Daly, supra note 8, at 1097. 
 135. For a comprehensive analysis of the risks and benefits of lawyers’ dual service as 
counsel and board members, see Kim, supra note 34.  Professor Kim concludes that service as 
both counsel and director is risky because “[l]awyers who attempt to fill both roles 
simultaneously risk a loss of professional independence that can impair their ability to perform 
either role well.”  Id. at 260; see also, e.g., ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 15; 
VILLA, supra note 89, at §§ 3:32, 6:23; Terrell, supra note 8, at 1006–07 (identifying ethical 
issues attendant upon a general counsel’s service on his or her employer’s board); Veasey & Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 15–17. 
 136. See Kim, supra note 34, at 221–45. 
 137. Id. at 239–42. 
 138. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-410 (1998). 
 139. See id.  But see Hazard, Three Afterthoughts, supra note 8, at 1053 (reflecting on 
possible benefits of lawyers’ service on client boards); Kim, supra note 34, at 204 (discussing the 
upside of lawyers’ service as directors); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 15 & nn.41–43 
(noting that there are benefits as well as disadvantages to service on client boards). 
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sometimes even more powerful impact on client corporations and the way 
constituents view the corporation’s lawyers.  The following discussion focuses 
on these kinds of informal roles—those that do not appear in any job 
description but often comprise an important part of what a general counsel 
does and account for much of his or her influence. 
a. Legal Services Marketer 
As Carl Liggio, former General Counsel of Ernst & Young and a founder 
of the Association of Corporate Counsel, has observed, “Within the corporate 
hierarchy, the legal department is a cost center, not a profit center.”140  This is 
one reason lawyers are not always popular with corporate constituents.  Many 
business managers—even those who hold to the highest standards of personal 
and corporate integrity—resent the cost of legal services and too often perceive 
lawyers as creators of obstacles rather than facilitators of business 
objectives.141  Yet lawyers cannot successfully represent clients who do not 
seek their services and willingly confide in them.  Consequently, to function 
effectively within a corporate structure, general counsel must persuade senior 
managers and others within their organizations that it makes sense to seek legal 
services early and often.142  This task has evolved into an internal marketing 
function that necessitates both educating managers as to why early legal input 
makes sense and demonstrating the ability of lawyers to “add value” in 
business contexts.143  While the sobering revelations of the corporate debacles 
of recent years should heighten awareness of the need for good legal counsel in 
business matters, internal marketing of legal services still remains an important 
component of in-house lawyers’ responsibility, particularly for general 
counsel. 
b. Ad Hoc Planning Advisor 
Prior to World War II, before a Masters in Business Administration from 
an elite business school had become an important qualification for senior 
managers of major corporations, many organizations valued a legal education 
as a credential for business leaders.144  Presumably this was because of respect 
 
 140. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, supra note 8, at 1219. 
 141. See id. (explaining that management often looks to corporate counsel to draw the 
difficult lines necessary to cut costs without jeopardizing “either the quality of service or the 
outcome of legal issues”). 
 142. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 477 
(2000) (reporting that 43% of lawyers in a survey of forty-two attorneys “indicated that they 
market the law and lawyers to others in the corporation”); see also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 8, at 28–30 (discussing importance of general counsel as “persuasive counselor”). 
 143. See Kim, supra note 34, at 199–200; Weaver, supra note 8, at 1027. 
 144. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 165–70. 
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for the rigorous approach to thinking that law schools instilled in their students 
and a belief that those capable of disciplined, logical analysis were well 
equipped to make business decisions.145  Unfortunately, as noted earlier, during 
the middle decades of the last century the general view of the acumen and 
value of in-house lawyers diminished considerably.146  In recent years, 
however, in-house lawyers have emerged as influential legal advisors to 
corporations and their constituents. 
Today, general counsel and many other in-house lawyers, like their 
predecessors in the early part of the last century,147 have become important 
resources for informal, as well as formal, corporate planning.148  As in-house 
lawyers have earned respect for their ability to offer perceptive insights on a 
variety of subjects important to the business planning process, constituents 
have come to consult their in-house lawyers early in the course of corporate 
initiatives, often seeking their advice before a new project is formally 
proposed.149  The exchanges that make these kinds of preliminary contacts 
possible arise out of a shared working environment that involves contacts in 
company meetings and social events, as well as chance encounters “at the 
water cooler.”150 
c. Ethics Counselor 
Whether or not a general counsel serves as the official ethics officer for his 
or her company, as in the informal planning context, general counsel often 
serve as trustworthy advisors or “wise counselors”151 when thorny issues arise.  
Many ethical dilemmas have legal ramifications, but, even in corporate 
settings, not all ethical issues involve legal questions.152  It is not at all 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. See supra Part I.A. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 283. 
 149. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 283–84 (noting importance of corporate 
counsel’s role in the informal planning process—”a noteworthy extension of the development of 
anticipatory law”—as a result of regular contact with senior business managers). 
 150. See Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1017–18; Weaver, supra note 8, at 1028. 
 151. See Bruce A. Green, Thoughts About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the Cigarette 
Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 
407 & n.1 (citing Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law 
Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410 (1985) (concerning the image of an “independent and 
influential counselor”)). 
 152. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that 
“the term ‘corporate responsibility’ also embraces ethical behavior beyond that demanded by 
minimum legal requirements”); Harold Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer’s 
Role, 34 BUS. LAW. 7, 16 (1978) (observing that “[w]e tend to resort to legality often as a 
guideline; in that sense, ethics is on the wane and the age of the legal technician is in full flower,” 
but “in . . .  practices in which our justification is that they are ‘legal,’ we are in a position we can 
no longer defend”). 
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uncommon for others to turn to a general counsel seeking moral or ethical 
guidance because of respect for his or her personal integrity and ability to think 
clearly.  As Professor Russell observes, “Lawyers are routinely called upon to 
exercise moral judgment in advising clients.  In the corporate setting, lawyers 
often become trusted advisers not only for their legal knowledge, but also for 
the practical wisdom they offer.”153 
d. Crisis Manager 
From industrial accidents to security breaches, from insider trading to 
workplace violence, every organization has crises that range along a continuum 
from minor incidents to financial debacles to terrible human tragedy.  Crises 
inevitably generate unwelcome consequences for organizations and the 
individuals connected with them.  For public companies, media attention 
frequently creates adverse publicity, and adverse publicity often impacts stock 
prices.  Depending on the nature of the underlying event, government 
investigators may arrive before it is even possible to sort out exactly what has 
happened.  Customers and employees may require immediate assistance, and 
psychological, as well as physical, needs must be addressed.  At times, human 
lives may be in danger, and the very survival of the entity may be at issue. 
In crisis situations, while operations managers deal with physical events 
and financial personnel assess the extent of monetary harm, immediate steps 
must be taken to obtain accurate information, inform directors, employees, and 
other key stakeholders, coordinate media statements, deal with government 
authorities, investigate what happened, and take steps to mitigate damage to 
the entity’s interests.  Each of these steps has significant legal ramifications.  In 
light of their legal expertise and leadership skills, general counsel are usually 
found in the midst of the fray, identifying what must be done and marshalling 
the resources necessary to do it.154 
 
 153. Russell, supra note 65, at 518–19.  But see DeMott, supra note 8, at 981 (noting that a 
CEO could reasonably believe that an outside attorney might be better able to serve in this 
counseling capacity because of the perception that he or she would “bring[] a greater measure of 
detachment to the exercise of judgment”). 
 154. “Counsel who are able to balance the company’s legal needs with the company’s public 
relations, business operations, and other needs, . . . are vital to success” in addressing a crisis.  
John R. Parker, Jr., Hard Tale of a Soft Drink: Dealing With a Corporate Crisis—It’s the Real 
Thing, BUS. L. TODAY, Jul.-Aug. 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2004-07-
08/parker.shtml.  For discussion of the roles counsel play in crisis situations, see, for example, 
ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 40 (citing seven sources therein); Jay G. 
Martin, Developing an Effective Crisis Management Plan for a Corporation, 65 TEX. BAR J. 233, 
237–38 (2002); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, When Bad Things Happen to Good 
Companies: A Crisis Management Primer, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 951, 956 (1994). 
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e. Arbitrator 
Yet another informal role that general counsel often play is that of 
arbitrator among corporate factions.155  While many different people may serve 
in this capacity within an organization, lawyers often have a skill set uniquely 
suited to identifying the issues at the core of internecine disputes and 
negotiating workable resolutions.  As chief legal officers, general counsel are 
ideally situated to appreciate the impact of factionalization and the damage that 
it can do, particularly when disgruntled employees fairly or unfairly believe 
that their rights have been violated or that another group within the entity has 
engaged in inappropriate behavior.  As lawyers trained in the art of 
negotiation, general counsel also have skills that often prove invaluable in 
resolving intracorporate disputes among business units or administrative 
departments. 
D. The Desirability of a Broad Vision of the Role of General Counsel 
Given the multifaceted roles contemporary general counsel play and the 
influence they exert, how these lawyers approach their responsibilities is at 
least as important as what they do.  Professor Ralph Cramton notes that 
“compliant lawyers” contributed significantly to the corporate debacles of the 
last several years.156  As Professor Thomas Bost writes, many lawyers lost 
their way because of a “dual failure of vision.”157  They lost sight of the 
corporation itself as their true client and they saw “their role in unacceptably 
narrow terms—as mere implementers or transaction engineers, rather than as 
broadly-gauged corporate counselors or advisers.”158  One of the principal 
goals of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Model Rules amendments, and other regulatory 
changes is to hold corporate lawyers more accountable and to prompt them to 
take a broader view of their responsibilities.  Lawyers willing to help dishonest 
managers clothe improper actions in legalistic trappings betray the very 
foundations of the profession; those who willingly turn their heads away from 
improprieties are little better.  Lawyers need to be proactive ethical actors 
capable of looking beyond the cribbed confines of technical legal questions 
and willing to respond assertively to safeguard the integrity of their client 
 
 155. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing general counsel as mediator) 
(citing Michele D. Beardslee, If Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are Introduced Into the United 
States, What Could or Should Be the Role of General Counsel?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 
24 (2003)). 
 156. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and 
Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 144 (2003) (“[C]ompliant lawyers as well as greedy 
executives, lazy directors and malleable accountants are necessary for large corporate frauds to 
come to life and persist long enough to cause major harm.”). 
 157. Bost, supra note 94, at 1090. 
 158. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 1021 
entities when they encounter evidence of wrongdoing.159  This is particularly 
true for general counsel, for they are invariably on the front lines in the 
corporate legal arena. 
Empirical studies of the way in which in-house counsel function are 
scarce; however studies specifically focused on general counsel and their 
impact on the entities they serve are virtually non-existent,160 but recent studies 
of in-house counsel generally, as well as a recent analysis of the ethical 
behavior of lawyers in large law firms, offer useful, if troubling, insights.  For 
example, an article published shortly before the collapse of Enron, Robert 
Nelson, and Laura Nielson suggested that “inside counsel construct different 
professional roles for themselves depending on the circumstances.”161  They 
observed a reluctance to constrain business managers, despite general 
acceptance of this function as a necessary element of counsel’s role in 
safeguarding the corporation.162  Nelson and Nielson also found substantial 
behavioral reciprocity—i.e., the ways in which business people treated lawyers 
influenced lawyers’ behavior and the attitudes of lawyers affected the behavior 
of other corporate constituents.163 
Professors Nelson and Nielson reported that in-house lawyers “were eager 
to be seen as part of the company, rather than as obstacles to getting things 
done.”164  They were willing to “discount[] their gatekeeping function in 
corporate affairs” to do so,165 although they did not wish to give up their 
identity as lawyers or the professional status accompanying this identity.166  
More than a year before Enron collapsed, Professors Nelson and Nielson 
presciently suggested that in-house lawyers too often “are subservient to 
management prerogatives. . . . despite profound changes in the structural 
 
 159. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 160. Professors Hugh and Sally Gunz have conjectured that the scarcity of studies may be a 
function of the employment of different methodologies by researchers in the sociology of the 
professions, ethics, and law.  As a result, researchers have worked in “silos” with “little cross-
fertilization.”  Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational 
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House Counsel, 
39 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 244–45 (2002). 
 161. Nelson & Nielson, supra note 142, at 457.  Professors Nelson and Nielson focused on 
four dimensions: “(1) the gatekeeping functions of corporate counsel; (2) how lawyers and 
executives view each other within the corporation; (3) the blending of legal and business advice; 
and (4) the distinctiveness of lawyers’ identities,” utilizing three ideal types: “cops,” “counsel” 
and “entrepreneurs.”  Id. at 460, 462.  Nelson and Nielson found that in-house counsel most 
frequently play the role of “counsel,” but that they also acted from time to time as “cops” policing 
other corporate constituents or as “entrepreneurs” emphasizing business values and seeking to use 
law aggressively to generate profits.  Id. at 464–66. 
 162. Id. at 471. 
 163. Id. at 490. 
 164. Id. at 477. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Nelson & Nielson, supra note 142, at 477–78. 
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position of inside counsel, in the presence of law in the corporate environment 
and the ideology of management itself.”167 
Given the similarities between sizable corporate law departments and large 
law firms,168 an ongoing study by Professor Kimberly Kirkland also offers 
relevant insights.  Utilizing the work of sociologist Robert Jackall on corporate 
bureaucracies, Professor Kirkland conducted an empirical analysis of choices 
of norms by associates in large law firms.169  She concluded that, much like 
corporate managers, large-firm lawyers tend to follow highly mutable norms: 
“the appropriate norms . . . are those of the people the lawyer is working 
for . . . at the time.”170  Professor Kirkland found that the “habit of mind” of 
these lawyers “is to discern the norm[s] ‘appropriate’ to the situation, not to 
judge the merits of any given norm.”171  Like Professor Jackall, Professor 
Kirkland warns that “[a] habit of mind that focuses on identifying what norms 
others would follow rather than on the content of the norms themselves will 
‘convert principles into guidelines, ethics into etiquette, [and] values into 
tastes.’”172 
In the absence of specific research pertaining to general counsel, the 
observations of Professors Nelson, Nielson, and Kirkland offer some of the 
best available information.  They suggest that lawyers in organizations are 
heavily influenced by the demands and objectives of the powerful players in 
their environments.  Consequently, despite their sense of professional 
independence, it is sometimes difficult for lawyers to separate themselves and 
their professional ethical obligations from organizational objectives and the 
norms elevated by the most powerful players in those organizations.  After a 
 
 167. Id. at 486. 
 168. See generally id. (analyzing the changes in law firms and in-house counsel). 
 169. See Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 631, 635–36 (2005). 
 170. Id. at 638.  Professor Kirkland applies Robert Jackall’s approach to analyzing ethical 
decision by corporate managers in the context of ethical decision-making by lawyers employed as 
associates by large law firms.  Id. at 635–36.  She concludes that in large law firms, as in 
corporate settings, “morality becomes indistinguishable from the quest for one’s own survival and 
advantage.”  Id. at 729 (quoting ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE 
MANAGERS 204 (1988)). 
 171. Id. at 638–39. 
 172. Id. at 639 (quoting JACKALL, supra note 170, at 204).  Another study reported by Mark 
Suchman, although focused primarily on large-firm corporate litigators, noted that in-house 
counsel involved in the exercise 
exhibited only passing concern for legal norms of any kind and focused, instead, on the 
often challenging task of reconciling managerial ideals . . . with the vagaries of a court 
system that operates on starkly different principles. . . . [A]lthough they were often more 
willing than outside counsel to link ethics and morality, in-house counsel rarely framed 
this linkage as a question of their professional obligations as lawyers. 
Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate 
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 845 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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time, the line between ethical and unethical behavior becomes harder to see 
and easier to cross.  It seems likely that general counsel are subject to the same 
kinds of influences.173 
However, there is also some good news.  As Professors Abram and 
Antonia Chayes observed, “The General Counsel sits close to the top of the 
corporate hierarchy as a member of senior management.”174  Consequently, a 
general counsel should have the authority necessary to set high standards for 
the lawyers employed by his or her company.  A strong general counsel who is 
a person of integrity is ideally situated to moderate the choice-of-norm 
phenomenon, create a positive role model, and require high ethical standards 
on the part of both the members of his or her department and the outside 
counsel the company retains.  As Professor Timothy Terrell suggested several 
years before the most recent rash of corporate debacles, 
[w]hat every corporation needs is [a] sophisticated lawyer who respects not 
only the strong foundations of the law but the nature and significance of its 
constraints as well. . . . who can, in a very special . . . way, be trusted by 
everyone to bring a troublingly expansive sense of the law and our legal 
system . . . when corporate decisions are made.175 
With this perspective in mind, the following discussion examines the role of 
general counsel pursuant to the professional conduct rules of the SEC’s Part 
205 and the amendments to Model Rule 1.13. 
II. THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE TONE AT THE TOP IN THE 
POST-ENRON/SARBANES-OXLEY ERA 
The events of the past several years have highlighted the importance of 
corporate general counsel with respect to legal compliance,176 especially the 
role of the general counsel in responding appropriately to evidence of possible 
 
 173. The debate continues over whether in-house lawyers, including general counsel, are 
more likely to succumb to client pressures than outside counsel.  See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 8, 
at 967–68; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 11–13; c.f. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra 
note 8, at 1019 (noting the possibility that constituents may retain outside counsel to provide 
advice on the basis of “selected facts”). 
 174. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 22, at 277; DeMott, supra note 8, at 964. 
 175. Terrell, supra note 8, at 1009; see also Liggio, A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel, 
supra note 8, at 630 (describing the “leader” model of general counsel); see also, e.g., Face 
Value: Where’s the Lawyer?, supra note 9 (discussing former General Electric Co. general 
counsel Benjamin Heineman’s ideal of general counsel as a “lawyer statesman”). 
 176. For discussion of the infamous corporate debacles at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century and their impact on lawyers, see, for example, Bost, supra note 94, at 1090; Cramton, 
Cohen & Koniak, supra note 80; Cramton, supra note 156; Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbox 307’s 
Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 559 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1024 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:989 
corporate wrongdoing.177  A number of scholars and practitioners, including 
those who have served as in-house lawyers, would argue that corporate counsel 
have always had a responsibility to seek out and address entity failures to 
comply with the law.178  It is also true, however, that earlier incarnations of 
Model Rule 1.13 and state rules based on its provisions allowed leeway for 
corporate counsel to view their responsibilities much too narrowly, thereby 
closing their eyes to problems.179  The amendments to Rule 1.13 and, for 
 
 177. See, e.g., Bost, supra note 94, at 1111; Cramton, supra note 156, at 186; DeMott, supra 
note 8, at 979. 
 178. For example, in an article written several years before the Enron debacle and the 
subsequent enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 2003 amendment to Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6, 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard stated: 
  In a properly run law department, the general counsel is alert to back-channel 
information as well as to “official information” within the corporation.  The general 
counsel knows that early interception of legally improper conduct is much easier than 
cleaning up a mess after the fact.  The general counsel has made it clear, by deed as well 
as pronouncement, that his or her door is open for confidential discussion with any lawyer 
down the line who confronts an ethically troublesome situation.  The general counsel has 
also made it clear, by deed as well as pronouncement, that he or she will take to the CEO, 
or to the Board of [D]irectors if necessary, any matter requiring such a reference.  The 
general counsel must further make clear in the same way that, assuming the staff lawyers 
have been able to refer difficult problems to the head legal office, the incumbent in the 
office will take responsibility for resolving them.  The general counsel knows that being 
open but tough-minded about ethical problems is much more effective than being 
sanctimonious. 
Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1021–22 (emphasis added); see also Cramton, supra 
note 156, at 154–55 (suggesting that “[a]lthough the [pre-August 2003] Rule [did] not explicitly 
require an organization’s lawyer to take a problem up the corporate ladder, that response [was] 
required in circumstances in which [the] action [was] the only one that [was] in the ‘best interest 
of the organization’”).  Professor Thomas Morgan stated: 
[S]ome critics of attorney conduct seem to assume that there was virtually no effective 
regulation of corporate attorneys prior to the federal Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  This is 
simply not true. . . . At least seven [of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on which 
most state rules are based], taken individually and together, define what state law has 
understood to be a corporate attorney’s duties in dealing with possible corporate crime or 
fraud. 
The Role of Attorneys in Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises, 108th Cong. 71–72 (2004) (statement of 
Professor Thomas D. Morgan).  But see Bost, supra note 94, at 1089 (“[T]he past four years or so 
have witnessed a convulsion and consequent seismic shift in the roles, duties, expectations, and 
liabilities of corporate lawyers.”). 
 179. See Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 80, at 738 (discussing confusing language 
and structure of MRPC 1.13 prior to the August 2003 amendments); Cramton, supra note 156, at 
145 (noting that as of 2002, ethical rules were “controverted, often ambiguous and provide[d] 
insufficient guidance to lawyers and inadequate protection to the public interest in preventing 
corporate frauds and illegalities.”).  As Professor Cramton has pointed out: 
  The conduct of the inside and outside lawyers who represented Enron, Arthur 
Andersen, and the many financial institutions involved in the Enron scandal tell the same 
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public companies, the SEC’s Part 205 rules impose specific requirements that 
make it very difficult for lawyers who represent entities—particularly general 
counsel—to close their eyes and ears to problems.180  Concomitant 
developments, such as the perception that corporate counsel are increasingly 
being named as defendants in civil enforcement proceedings, shareholder 
derivative actions, and even criminal prosecutions,181 have also raised the 
stakes for the lawyers who hold these positions. 
 
story that has been told to us by a long string of major financial frauds for fifty years: the 
professional ideal of “independent professional judgment” does not inform the behavior 
of some lawyers who represent large corporations in major transactions and high-stakes 
litigation.  These lawyers take the position that they must do everything for the client that 
the client’s managers want them to do, providing the conduct is permitted by law.  The 
problem is that by constantly going to the edge of the law and taking a very permissive 
view of what the law permits, these lawyers gradually adopt a mindset that ignores and 
may eventually assist the client’s managers in illegality that harms third persons and the 
client entity.  These lawyers have confused the role of advocates in litigation or adversary 
negotiation with the need of corporate clients for independent, objective advice in the 
course of corporate decision-making.  Current practices have resulted in a widespread 
problem, not just a failure of individual law firms. 
Cramton, supra note 156, at 173 (citations omitted).  But see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is 
There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2003) 
(concluding that the “Sarbanes-Oxley approach to corporate governance reform is flawed”); 
Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the Effort to 
Improve Corporate Lawyers’ Professional Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2–11 (2003) 
(questioning the value of new ethics mandates). 
 180. See, e.g., ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 18–19 (noting “[e]xpanded 
ethics role of General Counsel under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”); After Sarbanes-Oxley: A Panel 
Discussion on Law and Legal Ethics in the Era of Corporate Scandal, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
67 (2003); Susan D. Carle et al., The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the 
Corporate Attorney’s New Role, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 655 (2003); Karl A. Groskaufmanis, 
Climbing “Up the Ladder”: Corporate Counsel and the SEC’s Reporting Requirement for 
Lawyers, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 511 (2004); Morgan, supra note 179; Terry F. Moritz & Robert 
M. Oberlies, Up the Ladder and Beyond: Attorney Conduct and Reporting Duties with Respect to 
Issuers, Auditors and the Commission under SEC Implementing Rules to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 1402 PLI/CORP 307 (2004). 
 181. See, e.g., Janet Langford Kelly, Susan R. Sneider & Kelly A. Fox, The Relationship 
Between the Legal Department and the Corporation, 1 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 16:36.3 (Feb. 2006) (describing general counsel as “the new 
white collar criminal”).  For a detailed analysis of information available with respect to targeting 
of in-house counsel, see JOHN K. VILLA, SEC AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INSIDE 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (2005), available at http://www.acca.com/resource/v6063.  See also 
DeMott, supra note 8, at 974–75 (discussing recent enforcement actions against general counsel 
and the specific predicaments of Franklin C. Brown, General Counsel of Rite Aid and James V. 
Derrick, Jr., General Counsel of Enron).  A 2006 Washington Post article suggests, however, that 
“lawyers serving fraud-ridden companies have emerged relatively unscathed.”  Carrie Johnson, 
Legal Penalties in Corporate Frauds Seldom Paid by Legal Advisers, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 
2006, at D1. 
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Since the dust began to settle in the aftermath of Enron’s collapse, many 
corporate counsel have engaged in far-reaching efforts to establish internal 
controls designed to safeguard their clients both internally and externally.182  
Of course, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC initiatives pursuant to the statute have 
provided powerful incentives for upgrading corporate integrity efforts.  As the 
Association of Corporate Counsel’s materials, trade publications, and other 
legal and general media articles reveal, compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley is a 
major concern for many corporate lawyers, especially general counsel.183  A 
number of excellent scholarly articles and practical pieces have explored the 
nature and impact of the standards set forth in the SEC’s Part 205 rules and the 
August 2003 amendments to Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6,184 as well as the noisy 
withdrawal provisions the SEC proposed but never put into effect.185  The 
following discussion highlights key points pertaining to the role of general 
counsel as chief legal officers. 
In this context, it is important to realize that we are dealing not simply with 
professional ethics, but corporate governance issues as well.  As the Report of 
the ABA Task Force on Corporate Governance emphasized, “Lawyers are and 
should be important participants in corporate governance and important 
contributors to corporate responsibility. . . . a prudent corporate governance 
program should call upon lawyers—notably the corporation’s general 
counsel—to assist in the design and maintenance of the corporation’s 
procedures for promoting legal compliance.”186  In a similar vein, in August 
2003, the ABA House of Delegates resolved: 
 
 182. See, e.g., ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, EMERGING AND LEADING PRACTICES IN 
SARBOX 307 UP-THE-LADDER REPORTING AND ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
PROGRAMS: WHAT COMPANIES AND LAW FIRMS ARE DOING 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.acca.com/legres/corpresponsibility/attorney.php. 
 183. See, e.g., id. 
 184. See, e.g., Carle et al., supra note 180; Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 80; 
Groskaufmanis, supra note 180; Morgan, supra note 180; Russell, supra note 65.  For an earlier 
discussion of relevant issues, see Cramton, supra note 156.  The SEC also received extensive 
commentary on its proposed Sarbanes-Oxley Rules that affords insights from a variety of 
perspectives.  See SEC Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, IC-25919 (issued Jan. 29, 2003, effective Aug. 5, 
2003) (reporting receipt of 167 timely comment letters). 
 185. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act 
Release, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670–71 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/33-8150.htm.  In January 2003 the SEC proposed an alternative to the original 
noisy withdrawal provision that would have required issuers to inform the SEC of attorney 
withdrawals.  See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities 
Act Release, 68 Fed. Reg. 6824 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/33-8186.htm. 
 186. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20–21 (emphasis 
added). 
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Providing information and analysis necessary for [corporate] directors to 
discharge their oversight responsibilities, particularly as they relate to legal 
compliance matters, requires the active involvement of general counsel for the 
public corporation.187 
The critical question is whether the applicable rules effectively empower 
general counsel to do what is asked of them. 
A. The Role of the General Counsel Pursuant to SEC Provisions and the 
Model Rules 
Following the Enron fiasco, there was a general consensus that some 
corporate lawyers were confused about the identity of their true client—the 
entity itself.  In reality, of course, it simply may be that corporate lawyers were 
engaging in the kinds of choice-of-norm behavior described by Robert Jackall 
and Kimberly Kirland.188  The SEC and the ABA have devoted a great deal of 
effort to devising ways to prod lawyers to report problems to corporate actors 
with the power to address and resolve them.  General counsel—as chief legal 
officers—qualify as report recipients and are featured prominently in the 
SEC’s Part 205 rules.  The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 
chaired by James Cheek of Tennessee, also discussed the role of general 
counsel, although the Model Rules amendments recommended by the Task 
Force and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates do not specifically refer to 
general counsel or chief legal officers.189  This section offers a brief overview 
of the Part 205 rules and Model Rule 1.13, as amended in August 2003, from 
the perspective of the general counsel. 
1. General Counsel as Chief Legal Officers under the SEC’s Part 205 
Rules 
The SEC’s Part 205 rules apply to attorneys who represent registered 
issuers—i.e., publicly traded companies—and who are “appearing and 
practicing before the Commission.”190  The “appear or practice” language 
sweeps quite broadly, drawing in lawyers involved in many aspects of 
corporate representation, both in-house and outside.191  Pursuant to the Part 
205 rules, attorneys who appear or practice before the SEC, except those 
retained by chief legal officers or Qualified Legal Compliance Committees 
(QLCC) to investigate or assert a colorable defense to an alleged material 
 
 187. AUGUST 2003 ABA RESOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
 188. See supra Part III.B. 
 189. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 34–40. 
 190. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003). 
 191. See id. at § 205.2(a); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys, Securities Act Release 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 205), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm. 
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violation,192 must report evidence of material violations of law up the corporate 
ladder to the chief legal officer, or to both the chief legal officer and CEO, and 
the chief legal officer may in turn refer the report to a QLCC of the company’s 
board of directors,193 although relatively few entities have established 
QLCCs.194  Thus, the reporting attorney must go through the general counsel—
unless the attorney reasonably believes that a report to the chief legal officer or 
to the chief legal officer and CEO would be futile.195  In that event, the 
attorney may report directly to the corporation’s audit committee, another 
board committee comprised of independent directors, or to the full board if 
there is no committee of independent directors.196 
As a chief legal officer, the general counsel of an issuer is deemed to be a 
supervisory attorney “appearing and practicing” before the SEC197 with 
concomitant responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
subordinate attorneys conform to applicable reporting requirements.198  If and 
when the chief legal officer receives a report of a material violation, the chief 
legal officer must either refer the matter to a QLCC or conduct a reasonable 
inquiry to determine whether the purported material violation “has occurred, is 
ongoing, or is about to occur.”199  Unless the chief legal officer reasonably 
believes that there is no such material violation, the chief legal officer must 
“take all reasonable steps to cause the company to adopt an appropriate 
response”—i.e., endeavor to cause the company to stop the violation, try to 
prevent it from happening, or initiate steps to rectify the consequences of the 
violation.200 
Whether or not he or she determines that a material violation has occurred, 
the chief legal officer must notify the reporting lawyer of his or her findings.201  
If the chief legal officer has found that a material violation has occurred, is 
 
 192. Lawyers acting in this capacity, however, are subject to the rules set forth in 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 205.3(b)(6) & (7) (2003). 
 193. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2003). 
 194. See Bost, supra note 94, at 1107 (citing Susan Hackett, QLCCs: The In-House 
Perspective, WALL ST. LAW., May 2004, available at http://www.acca.com/resource/v6355); Eli 
Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1251 (2005) (noting limited use of QLCCs and stating that as of September 30, 2005, 
97.5% of issuers did not have QLCCs). 
 195. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(4) (2003). 
 196. Id. at §§ 205.3(b)(4) & (3). 
 197. Id. at § 205.4(a).  See generally VILLA, supra note 89, at § 8:6. 
 198. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.4(a), (b) (2003).  However, attorneys under the direct supervision of 
chief legal officers—e.g., deputy general counsel—are not subordinate attorneys pursuant to the 
Part 205 rules.  Id. at § 205.5(a).  See generally VILLA, supra note 89, at § 8:6. 
 199. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2003).  The chief legal officer also has the option of referring 
the report to a QLCC and informing the reporting attorney of this referral.  Id. at § 205.3(c)(2). 
 200. Id. at § 205.3(b)(2). 
 201. Id. 
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ongoing, or is about to occur, the chief legal officer must advise the reporting 
attorney of the responsive actions undertaken.202  If the reporting lawyer does 
not reasonably believe that the responsive actions are appropriate he or she 
must go to the audit committee, another committee of the board comprised of 
independent directors, or to the full board if there is no such committee.203  If, 
after a reasonable time, the reporting attorney still does not reasonably believe 
the corporation has responded appropriately, the attorney must explain why to 
the chief legal officer, CEO, and/or directors to whom the attorney made the 
reports.204  Ultimately, the reporting attorney may reveal “confidential 
information related to the representation” to the SEC without the corporation’s 
consent if the attorney reasonably believes that this disclosure is necessary to 
prevent “a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of the issuer or investors,” to prevent the 
corporation from committing or suborning perjury or to avert a fraud upon the 
Commission, or “to rectify consequences of a material violation by the issuer 
that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest of the 
issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney’s services were 
used.”205  An attorney who believes that he or she has been discharged as a 
result of reporting evidence of a material violation as provided in the rules 
“may notify the [corporation’s] board of directors or any committee thereof 
that he or she believes that he or she has been discharged for reporting 
evidence of a material violation.”206 
Of course, the optimal solution for lawyers and corporations alike would 
be to create an environment that obviates the necessity for reporting damaging 
information outside the client entity.  It would be naïve, however, to assume 
that optimal results are likely in all situations.  However, the general counsel, 
through his or her formal and informal interactions with business managers and 
other in-house and outside lawyers, is in an ideal position to foster an 
environment of integrity and legal compliance within the corporation. 
If a chief legal officer is unsuccessful in efforts to get an entity to avert, 
cease, or remedy a material violation, however, like the reporting attorney, he 
or she has the option of resigning and/or reporting out relevant information.207  
 
 202. Id.  Appropriate responses include corporate action to prevent the violation or cause it to 
cease, remedial steps, and/or retention of a lawyer to investigate the matter with the consent of the 
board or a QLCC or other appropriate board committee.  Id. at § 205.2(b). 
 203. Id. at § 205.3(b)(3). 
 204. 17 C.F.R. § 205(b)(9) (2003). 
 205. Id. at § 205.3(d)(2). 
 206. Id. at § 205.3(b)(10).  But see VILLA, supra note 89, at § 8.11 (noting that the § 205.1 
preemption of conflicting state ethics rules protects attorneys who disclose client confidences in 
such circumstances “only where the attorney has in fact acted as required by the rules and does so 
in good faith”). 
 207. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2003). 
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It seems possible that a general counsel might choose to resign if the directors 
of the client corporation refused to address evidence of a material violation,208 
although that decision might well encompass economic considerations and 
other extra-professional standards.209  It is harder to envision that a general 
counsel would elect to report out damaging information.  To do so would not 
only go against client loyalty and constituent ties, but it could constitute 
professional suicide.  What corporation or other organization would hire as its 
senior counsel an attorney who reported another entity and its senior managers 
to law enforcement authorities?  Consequently, it is particularly important to 
empower general counsel to act internally to promote corporate integrity. 
2. Mandatory Reporting and Permissive Disclosure Pursuant to Model 
Rule 1.13 
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.13 specifically pertains to 
representation of entities.210  Since its inception, Rule 1.13 has provided that 
lawyers who represent corporations and other organizations must place 
allegiance to the entity over loyalty to constituents.211  The August 2003 
amendments to the rule add a presumptive reporting-up requirement and, in 
tandem with amendments to the client confidentiality provisions of Model 
Rule 1.6, identify circumstances in which reporting out otherwise confidential 
client information is permissible.212 
Unlike the Part 205 rules, the up-ladder reporting obligation set forth in 
Model Rule 1.13(b) applies not only to public corporations but to all entities.  
The reporting duty arises when an attorney “knows” of conduct by a 
constituent “in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a 
legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that might reasonably 
be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury 
to the organization . . . .”213  In such situations, “[u]nless the lawyer reasonably 
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do 
 
 208. See DeMott, supra note 8, at 967–68. 
 209. See id. at 967–69. 
 210. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).  The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct came into existence on August 2, 1983.  Since that time, Rule 1.13(a) has provided: “A 
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
duly authorized constituents.”  Id. at R. 1.13(a).  For information pertaining to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, see the website of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html. 
 211. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 102, at § 17.2. 
 212. As Professors Hazard and Hodes observe, however, “[N]otwithstanding the Enron, 
WorldCom, and other scandals that gave rise to the important amendments to Rules 1.6 and 1.13 
that were approved as a package by the ABA House of Delegates in 2003, . . . Rule 1.13 is still 
almost an entirely ‘inward-looking rule.’”  HAZARD & HODES, supra note 102, at § 17.2. 
 213. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003); see generally HAZARD & 
HODES, supra note 102. 
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so,” he or she must “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can 
act on behalf of the organization . . . .”214 
Model Rule 1.13(c) permits reporting information outside the corporation 
even if Rule 1.6 would not otherwise permit disclosure, but only if reporting up 
efforts have been unavailing, and, even then, only in the event of a clear 
violation of the law that “the lawyer reasonably believes . . . is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, . . . but only if and to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent” the injury.215  
This permissive disclosure provision does not apply to attorneys engaged to 
investigate or defend against alleged legal violations.216  Of course, corporate 
counsel, like all attorneys operating under ethics laws substantially identical to 
the Model Rules, may invoke the longstanding confidentiality exceptions of 
Rule 1.6 to disclose information “to prevent reasonably certain death or 
substantial bodily harm,”217 as well as to prevent the client from using the 
lawyer’s services to further a crime or fraud,218 or to “prevent, mitigate or 
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another” as a 
result of such misuse of the lawyer’s services.219  Ultimately, the lawyer may 
also withdraw from the representation and “proceed as the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to assure that the organization’s highest authority is 
informed of the lawyer’s . . . withdrawal.”220  Consistent with the SEC rule, the 
same procedure applies to a lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has 
been discharged because of his or her report.221 
The role of the general counsel is implicit in the amendments to Rule 1.13, 
because the general counsel is precisely the type of “higher authority” to whom 
most in-house and outside lawyers would naturally report upon discovery of a 
significant problem likely to injure the client.  Although neither Model Rule 
1.13 nor the accompanying commentary specifies that a report to an entity’s 
general counsel/chief legal officer is required, corporations and other entities 
can create such requirements through contractual provisions.  The general 
counsel is also bound by the requirement to report up conduct likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization.  Since the scope of the general counsel’s 
representation is arguably coextensive with the operation of the entity itself, 
the amendment underscores the general counsel’s obligation to communicate 
about any such matters with the CEO and, ultimately, the board of directors. 
 
 214. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003). 
 215. Id. at R. 1.13(c). 
 216. Id. at R. 1.13(d). 
 217. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). 
 218. Id. at R. 1.6 (b)(2). 
 219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(3) (2003). 
 220. Id. at R. 1.13(e). 
 221. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 206. 
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3. Sarbanes-Oxley’s Independent Counsel Provisions 
In viewing the emerging ethical landscape from the perspective of general 
counsel, another provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is particularly worth noting.  
Section 301 of the statute amends section 10A of the Securities Act of 1934 to 
provide: “Each audit committee shall have the authority to engage independent 
counsel and other advisers, as it determines necessary to carry out its 
duties.”222  The statute further provides that payment for these services is to 
come from corporate funds.223  Sarbanes-Oxley’s independent counsel 
provisions underscore a trend that is already well established in corporate law.  
The impact of the increasing frequency of retention of independent counsel by 
directors, as well as the persistent practice of separate retention of counsel by 
other constituents is discussed below.224 
B. The Critical Role of the General Counsel in Fostering a Climate 
Conducive to Reporting Up and Resolving Significant Legal Problems 
The legal and professional standards established by the SEC’s Part 205 
rules and state ethics standards adopting and adapting amended Model Rule 
1.13 define the boundaries of a new ethical framework, particularly for public 
companies.  While both approaches require up-ladder reporting and permit 
limited external disclosure, whether these rules will accomplish their intended 
objectives depends not only on their enforcement by external authorities but 
also on their internalization by members of the legal profession and the entities 
they serve.  Internalization is less a function of paper policies and procedures 
than it is a product of institutional culture and the ability and willingness of 
those in charge to make the system work.225  There is perhaps no more critical 
player in this process than the general counsel. 
As head of the law department and the individual with the most direct and 
comprehensive responsibility for the legal aspects of an entity’s operation,226 
the general counsel has a great deal to do with the much touted “tone at the 
top” of a corporation.  There are some checks and balances built into the 
system—primarily in the Part 205 provisions mandating reports to the CEO or 
 
 222. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002).  
The term “separate” counsel is sometimes used interchangeably with “independent” counsel, but 
as Chief Justice Veasey and Ms. Di Guglielmo point out, in any given situation “independence” 
depends on “a context-specific inquiry.”  Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 9.  Separately 
retained counsel are not necessarily “independent.” 
 223. Id. at § 301(m)(6). 
 224. See supra Part III.A. 
 225. Enforcement is critical.  Enron, for example, had a business ethics code that was a work 
of art on paper.  See Enron Code of Ethics, available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/enron/ 
enronethics1.html (last visited June 25, 2007). 
 226. This is particularly true in light of most companies’ relegation of outside counsel to 
episodic representation.  See supra Part I.C.1.c.ii. 
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audit committee if chief legal officers fail to fulfill their responsibilities and the 
referral to the “highest authority” required in Model Rule 1.13 when lesser 
authorities have failed to mend their ways.227  In reality, however, general 
counsel are likely to continue to exert great influence because of the practical 
difficulty of contacting CEOs and board members, and because of the extent to 
which most in-house and outside lawyers depend upon positive relationships 
with general counsel in doing and keeping their jobs or clients. 
In light of the influence they exert, or have the potential to exert, in the 
corporate arena, it is reasonable to impose a major part of the responsibility for 
navigating the new ethical landscape on general counsel.  Congress, the SEC, 
and, albeit less explicitly, the profession itself have placed significant trust in 
the ability of chief legal officers to accomplish this task.  It remains to be seen 
whether the regulatory framework is adequate to empower general counsel to 
perform their ethical obligations228 and to hold them accountable when they 
fail to do so. 
III.  BEGINNING A CONVERSATION: AREAS THAT MERIT CONSIDERATION 
WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL FUNCTION 
The first part of this article touched upon the multifaceted formal and 
informal responsibilities of corporate general counsel, the significance of their 
role in promoting corporate integrity and the importance of a broad vision of 
the position in combating the kinds of choice-of-norm phenomena that may 
undermine the professional ethics of corporate lawyers as well as the integrity 
of other corporate constituents.  The second section focused on the functions 
assigned to chief legal officers pursuant to the Part 205 rules and implicit in 
amended Model Rule 1.13.  As lawyers, regulators, and legal scholars gain 
experience with the new rules, ongoing evaluation of their operation will be 
essential.  This assessment should include analysis of their impact on general 
counsel, as well as other critical players.  In an effort to initiate conversation 
on the role of general counsel, the following discussion briefly focuses on two 
of the many areas that merit ongoing consideration in the new ethical 
landscape: (1) the implications of the practice of hiring independent counsel to 
advise directors and other constituents and (2) general counsel-director 
relationships. 
A. Separate Counsel Provisions and the Need for Counsel Coordination 
Provisions 
On occasion, senior officers, business units, and other corporate 
constituents engage outside lawyers without the knowledge of the general 
 
 227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(b) (2003). 
 228. As Professor Coffee has saliently observed, “Deterrence is easy, but empowerment is 
more complex.”  Coffee, supra note 72, at 1315. 
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counsel or law department.  At one time, the frequency with which this 
phenomenon occurred reflected the extent of a general counsel’s influence, the 
ways in which legal expenses were allocated and paid by various corporate 
components, and the extent to which corporate constituents believed that they 
could obtain better—or perhaps less “conservative”—advice or other 
assistance from outside lawyers.229 More recently, it has become relatively 
common for corporate boards and board committees, particularly those 
comprised of independent directors, to retain separate counsel.230  This latter 
phenomenon is related to developments such as the proliferation of 
shareholders’ derivative actions and the use of special litigation committees to 
evaluate the claims and determine board responses to the litigation,231 the 
necessity for independent assessment of management actions in connection 
with certain types of corporate combinations,232 and, in the post-Enron world, 
the call for corporate-wide internal investigations of allegations of misconduct 
implicating general counsel along with other senior managers.233 
While it is sometimes necessary, retention of separate counsel by corporate 
constituents can be antithetical to the best interests of the entity.  Constituents 
are unlikely to obtain the best possible legal advice for the entity without law 
department involvement.  This is not because they will hire inadequate 
lawyers, but because lawyers retained in this fashion often lack sufficient 
knowledge of the way in which a particular matter fits into the overall 
objectives of the entity.  In some situations, they may not even be aware that 
they lack information material to their task.  Lawyers are also at risk of 
receiving “selected” facts from constituents seeking to circumvent unfavorable 
advice from in-house counsel or looking to pursue avenues outside permitted 
channels.234  From an institutional point of view, uncoordinated efforts to 
attack problems often waste corporate resources and create the risk of 
inconsistent advice or litigation at odds with broader objectives.  Perhaps most 
importantly, while it is easy to believe that “independent” counsel will bring 
objective analyses to bear on problems, there is no compelling reason to 
believe that the end result will be better from a business perspective or more 
 
 229. See infra text accompanying note 236. 
 230. For discussion of the emergence of the practice and an evaluation of potential benefits 
and problems, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: 
The Emergence of Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389 (2004); see also Veasey, 
supra note 74, at 1414–15 (suggesting that regular ongoing retention of separate counsel for 
directors or board committees is unnecessary). 
 231. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 230, at 1391–92. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. at 1392. 
 234. See Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1019; see also supra note 173 and 
accompanying text. 
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likely to promote corporate integrity, and such engagements may cost a 
company a great deal in terms of human and financial resources. 
Many commentators have emphasized that in-house counsel may be less 
independent than outside lawyers because they have only one client—their 
employer.235  It is equally true, however, that outside counsel “may be retained 
on the basis of selected facts precisely to accommodate a response that 
provides a desired outside opinion.”236  With major economic interests at stake, 
more than one law firm has provided overly aggressive opinions to support a 
questionable transaction or an opinion supporting a manager’s effort to 
circumvent “overly conservative” in-house counsel.  The report of the ABA 
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility specifically notes that “[t]he 
competition to acquire and keep client business, [like] the desire to advance 
within the corporate executive structure, may induce lawyers to seek to please 
the corporate officials with whom they deal rather than to focus on the long-
term interest of their client, the corporation.”237  Outside advice based on 
incomplete knowledge or a lack of understanding of the reasons in-house 
lawyers have insisted on particular courses of action, can draw corporations 
into dangerous waters.  Finally, when constituents retain outside counsel 
without the help of in-house lawyers, they often pay more for services because 
they fail to negotiate favorable fee structures or they do not manage the 
engagement efficiently. 
For public corporations, the new ethical framework may have the 
incidental effect of promoting coordination of counsel.  The August 2003 
Resolutions of the ABA House of Delegates advise that 
[a]ll reporting relationships of internal and outside lawyers for a public 
corporation [should] establish at the outset a direct line of communication with 
general counsel through which these lawyers are to inform the general counsel 
of material potential or ongoing violations of law by, and breaches of fiduciary 
duty to, the corporation.238 
This admonition is not, however, incorporated into the Model Rules, nor do the 
rules contain any other coordination-of-counsel provision applicable to lawyers 
representing entities. 
The considerations relevant to retention of independent counsel by 
corporate boards and board committees comprised of independent directors are 
different.  In this context, consultation of independent counsel offers distinct 
advantages because it affords access to legal advice free of the predilections or 
self-protective biases that may taint the advice of in-house lawyers and law 
 
 235. For informative discussions of the independence issue, see DeMott, supra note 8, at 
967–68; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 11–12. 
 236. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1019. 
 237. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 15. 
 238. AUGUST 2003 ABA RESOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at ¶ 7(c). 
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firms with close relationships to the company.  In some instances—e.g., 
decisions by special litigation committees pertaining to shareholders’ 
derivative actions—statutory mandates require or, as a practical matter, 
necessitate consultation with independent counsel.239  Similarly, the use of 
separate counsel allows independent directors to bypass general counsel 
potentially implicated in questionable corporate activities or unable to break 
free of the influence of CEOs or other senior managers.  Retention of separate 
counsel aids in avoiding dangerous situations in which lawyers are called upon 
to evaluate their own prior work, so long as the outside counsel retained are 
truly independent.240  This is presumably why Sarbanes-Oxley specifically 
provides that the audit committees of corporations or public companies must 
have authority to retain independent counsel at the corporation’s expense.241  A 
similar rationale underlies the ABA House of Delegates’ August 2003 
resolution that “[e]ngagements of counsel by the board of directors, or by a 
committee of the board, for special investigations or independent advice should 
be structured to assure independence and direct reporting to the board of 
directors or the committee.”242 
Nevertheless, even for boards and board committees there are also 
downsides to retaining separate counsel.  For example, retaining separate 
counsel to conduct an internal investigation makes sense when independent 
directors need to evaluate the validity of claims in shareholders’ derivative 
actions, when there is evidence of pervasive senior management problems, or 
when the conduct of the general counsel herself is in question.243  Even so, 
many of the same kinds of problems applicable to constituent retention of 
counsel—advice based on an insufficient knowledge base, unnecessary 
redundancies in the performance of legal tasks, and significantly increased 
financial and human resource costs—may arise.244  There is also a danger that 
directors may employ independent counsel in an effort to exonerate themselves 
when charges of wrongdoing arise rather than to serve the best interests of the 
entity.  In such cases the effect may be to salvage the directors at the expense 
of the company and its shareholders.  Consequently, retention of separate 
counsel is far from a panacea. 
 
 239. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 230, at 1390–91; Veasey, supra note 74, at 1414. 
 240. Vinson & Elkins found itself in a great deal of trouble as a result of an internal 
investigation conducted by firm lawyers into Enron matters in which the firm had provided legal 
advice.  The firm was investigating not only the conduct of a major client, but its own.  See Bost, 
supra note 94, at 1098; see also NEAL BATSON, FINAL REPORT OF NEAL BATSON, COURT-
APPOINTED EXAMINER (2003), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examinerfinal.html. 
 241. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002). 
 242. AUGUST 2003 ABA RESOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at ¶ 9. 
 243. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 230, at 1390; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 
8–10. 
 244. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 230, at 1411–12; supra note 93. 
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In addition, when other counsel enter the mix—whether at the behest of 
directors or other constituents—the ties between officers, directors, and other 
key players and corporate general counsel may be weakened,245 thereby 
making it more difficult for general counsel to address other legal issues.  It 
certainly becomes more difficult to hold general counsel accountable for legal 
matters relevant to matters addressed by outside lawyers acting beyond their 
control and sometimes even without their knowledge.  The ABA Task Force 
on Corporate Responsibility emphasized that “[t]he general counsel of a public 
corporation should have primary responsibility for assuring the implementation 
of an effective legal compliance system under the oversight of the board of 
directors.”246  It is unrealistic to expect any general counsel to oversee legal 
compliance effectively without assurance that lawyers retained to handle 
corporate business or investigate suspected wrongdoing coordinate with them 
in some fashion. 
As a society we have become enamored of “independent” professionals.  
Independent counsel are only one species; others include “independent” 
doctors, consultants, prosecutors, examiners, testing laboratories, and many 
more.  These independent professionals and entities can do a great deal of 
good, but they should not supplant those charged with the responsibility for 
ensuring the integrity of a corporation or any other institution.247  Used 
judiciously, independent counsel provide invaluable services, but the trend 
toward employing lawyers who are not answerable to general counsel neither 
empowers general counsel to fulfill their obligations nor offers a basis to hold 
them fully accountable for corporate legal compliance or ethical behavior on 
the part of the lawyers who represent these entities. 
In a recent article on the independent counsel phenomenon, Delaware’s 
former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, a preeminent expert in corporate law 
who chaired the ABA’s Ethics 2000 Commission, concurred with the ABA 
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility in cautioning against the idea that 
audit committees should retain separate counsel on an ongoing basis.248  In 
Chief Justice Veasey’s view: 
 
 245. See DeMott, supra note 8, at 980 (discussing the impact of retention of independent 
counsel on general counsel’s relationship to the Board and CEO). 
 246. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 32. 
 247. Moreover, even “independent” professionals are not always free of the problem of client 
confusion.  See id. at 26 (“Too often, even when an outside adviser is formally engaged by the 
board of directors or by a committee of the board, the adviser’s view of the senior executive 
officers as the client has influenced the advice rendered.”). 
 248. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 n.54 
(cautioning that “retention of counsel other than general corporate counsel to advise the board of 
directors or one or more of its committees . . . may result in less open communication, less 
constructive collaboration between directors and senior executive officers, and, ultimately, less 
effective oversight by the board of directors”); Veasey, supra note 74, at 1414–15; Veasey & Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 8–10 (noting that independence issues apply to outside as well as in-
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the real “heavy lifting” in this new world of corporate governance must 
generally be done by the general counsel and her in-house counsel staff, 
supplemented when necessary by the corporation’s regular outside counsel.  It 
is the general counsel . . . who must shape the quest for best practices by the 
board . . . one would expect that a highly professional general counsel would 
have the intellectual honesty to counsel directors when they should consider 
separate representation.249 
Chief Justice Veasey’s point is a compelling one.  The judgment of outside 
counsel, while their services are often invaluable, should rarely substitute for 
the judgment of a general counsel whose sole professional responsibility is to 
represent one organization.250 
Two conclusions flow from this analysis.  First, incorporation of some type 
of coordination provision applicable to lawyers retained to represent entities 
with general counsel into Model Rule 1.13 merits serious consideration.  The 
proviso could be applied unless the client entity’s CEO, board, or a board 
committee directs otherwise, or the counsel retained in such circumstances 
reasonably believes that communication with the chief legal officer would 
imperil the well-being of the entity itself.  Such a requirement would also 
strengthen the creation of lines of communication between all lawyers and 
corporate general counsel.251  In the same vein, even when independent 
counsel must keep an entity’s general counsel out of an investigative loop, as a 
matter of good governance practice, directors should still require investigating 
counsel to follow the company’s standard practices with respect to billing to 
the extent that this does not interfere in the substance of the investigation.252  
Otherwise, the company loses the benefit of policies developed by those most 
expert at ensuring good quality, high-value legal products.  This is particularly 
true when payment for separate counsel comes out of the law department’s 
budget without any departmental oversight. 
 
house counsel and that “determining the independence of counsel requires a context-specific 
inquiry”). 
 249. Veasey, supra note 74, at 1414–15; see also Hazard & Rock, supra note 230, at 1402–
03. 
 250. As Chief Justice Veasey also notes: 
  The independent directors must make the decision whether and when they need 
special outside counsel on a continuing basis.  For this decision-making process they 
should be able to turn to the general counsel or to the corporation’s regular outside 
counsel, who must have the professionalism and integrity to provide the directors with 
unvarnished, objective advice.  If these counsels are not up to that task, they should be 
replaced. 
Veasey, supra note 74, at 1418. 
 251. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, 36–38. 
 252. These kinds of policies ordinarily address the level of detail required for billing, 
presentation of charges, limitations on expenses, and related matters. 
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Second, it is essential to continue the current exploration of the relative 
merits of the retention of independent counsel by corporate boards and board 
committees.  Assuming that the trend continues, it makes sense to consider the 
development of guidance to assist corporate directors in determining when 
retention of independent counsel is appropriate and when such engagements 
are unnecessary or perhaps even counterproductive. 
B. Ongoing Attention to the Relationship Between General Counsel and 
Corporate Directors 
Good governance principles and professional responsibility on the part of 
corporate lawyers should operate in tandem to facilitate a healthy economic 
climate in which business managers, corporations, and corporate lawyers are 
mutually accountable.  The work of Nelson and Nielson discussed earlier in 
this article reinforces the common sense proposition that the way people are 
treated influences the way they behave.253  In particular, Professors Nelson and 
Nielson found that the business manager-lawyer relationship in in-house 
settings involves considerable reciprocity.254  Similarly, Professor Kirkland, by 
adapting the approach Professor Jackall developed to study choices of norms in 
corporate settings, found that associates in large law firms often make 
decisions on the basis of perceptions of what it takes to survive and advance in 
a law firm environment rather than by evaluating the content of applicable 
norms on the basis of an internal moral compass.255  These studies highlight 
the importance of aligning the objectives of both business managers and 
business lawyers with those of society.  Shared objectives need to include a 
strong sense of the importance of complying with the law.  In the end, perhaps 
the most useful aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC implementing rules is 
not the resulting procedural mechanism but the clear message that norms are 
not fungible and that business managers and corporate attorneys need to work 
together to ensure corporate integrity. 
Achieving the goal of prioritizing legal compliance in the corporate arena 
becomes possible when, as the Report of the ABA Task Force on Professional 
Responsibility emphasizes, lawyers, business people, courts, and legislatures 
recognize the integral interrelationship between corporate governance and the 
role of corporate lawyers.256  Pursuant to Task Force recommendations, in 
August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates adopted several resolutions 
highlighting this relationship.  Its proposals included injunctions that: 
 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 161–67. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 169–72. 
 256. See CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 & nn.20–21. 
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Public corporations should adopt practices in which: 
a. The selection, retention, and compensation of the corporation’s general 
counsel are approved by the board of directors. 
b. General counsel meets regularly and in executive session with a committee 
of independent directors to communicate concerns regarding legal 
compliance matters, including potential or ongoing material violations of 
law by, and breaches of fiduciary duty to, the corporation.257 
These resolutions delineate important strategies for enhancing the 
relationship between general counsel and corporate managers, but they could 
go farther.  While, as the Task Force Report recognizes, corporations and other 
entities differ with respect to the structure of the reporting relationships of 
general counsel,258 general counsel should always have a reporting relationship 
to the board, as well as to the CEO, and open lines of communication with 
independent directors.  It needs to be crystal clear to all concerned that this 
should be a two-way process facilitated by directors as well as the general 
counsel.  Without such clarity, the ability of the general counsel to safeguard 
the entity’s best interests is necessarily compromised in important respects.  
Boards need to be educated about the ethical responsibilities of general counsel 
and all corporate lawyers, including those hired directly by the board or board 
members in their official capacity. 
Second, general counsel or another senior attorney should ordinarily attend 
all plenary board meetings, as well as significant committee meetings.259  
General counsel are in the best position to assist directors in identifying legal 
obligations and to caution them against potential violations of the law.  Given 
the breadth of matters in which public companies may be involved, even the 
most capable lawyer may not catch every issue.  Nevertheless, the presence of 
counsel at board meetings offers the best possibility of minimizing such errors.  
It also provides opportunities for general counsel to educate directors as to 
relevant legal obligations.  Although the calculus is somewhat different with 
respect to meetings of independent directors, the general counsel has a 
professional obligation with respect to all legal aspects of the corporation’s 
operation and governance.  Consequently, as Chief Justice Veasey and Ms. Di 
Guglielmo have recently suggested, it is generally a good idea for general 
 
 257. AUGUST 2003 ABA RESOLUTIONS, supra note 5, at ¶ 7; see also REPORT OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(Nov. 2006), 62 BUS. LAW. 427, 482–83 (2006) [hereinafter N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE 
REPORT] (emphasizing the importance of general counsel’s relationship with and access to the 
board). 
 258. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 29; see also ASS’N 
OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 66, at 24 (citing data showing that a high percentage, but 
not all, of general counsel report directly to corporate boards as well as to senior managers). 
 259. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 17. 
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counsel “to attend or at least be available to attend [independent director 
meetings], absent some personal involvement of counsel in the subject matter 
under discussion.”260  At a minimum, as the ABA Task Force recommends, 
general counsel should meet periodically with their company’s independent 
directors in executive session.261 
Third, general counsel should, as a matter of course, inform the board of 
changes in counsel employment or retention arrangements in the event of: (1) 
termination or resignation of the general counsel or another senior in-house 
counsel, or (2) the termination or withdrawal of a law firm handling major 
work for the entity in the course of the representation rather than at its 
completion.  As a matter of good governance, it is not enough to simply rely on 
individual lawyers who believe they have been inappropriately discharged.262  
The board, or a committee of the board, should require information as to the 
reasons for termination, resignation, or withdrawal of lawyers who have 
previously played significant roles in corporate matters and inquire into 
matters that raise particular concerns.  While most of these changes are 
unlikely to be related to concerns over corporate integrity, as a matter of good 
governance, directors should take steps to satisfy themselves of the reason for 
the discharge or withdrawal. 
Corporate managers do not operate under the kinds of rules of professional 
responsibility applicable to lawyers.  Nevertheless, lawyers are instrumental in 
advising boards and legislatures on good governance practices, and courts are 
in a position to comment on the practices of organizations that come before 
them in the course of litigation.  The ABA Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility made great strides in identifying good governance practices 
already in place in many organizations but sorely needed in others.  It is 
important to continue this work in both the legal and corporate arenas. 
CONCLUSION 
As Professor Hazard noted ten years ago, “[T]he role of corporate counsel 
is among the most complex and difficult of those functions performed by 
lawyers.”263  This observation applies with particular force to general counsel, 
and, if anything, the role they play has become more complex during the past 
 
 260. Id.  Independent directors may have concerns abut confidentiality vis-à-vis general 
counsel who report to CEOs, but it is incumbent upon general counsel to maintain the 
confidentiality of independent director meetings.  Those who cannot do so should face 
termination.  This is one of the necessary tensions inherent in the general counsel function.  See 
generally Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8.  See also DeMott, supra note 8, at 956–57; 
N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 257, at 480–81. 
 261. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 32, 70. 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 206 & 221. 
 263. See Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 1011. 
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decade.264  It is critical for the profession to recognize that general counsel are 
pivotal players in the new ethical landscape.  As a New York City Bar Task 
Force recently emphasized, “Strengthening the role of the General Counsel 
should be a high priority in efforts to promote compliance with laws, including 
the securities laws.”265  Regulatory standards and ethical rules should empower 
general counsel to do their jobs and hold them accountable when they fail to 
meet their obligations. 
 
 
 264. See DeMott, supra note 8, at 980 (noting the likelihood that the role of general counsel 
will continue to change over time); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 36 (observing that 
“[n]ot only lawyers but also directors and officers need to understand and appreciate the 
complexities and the ever-changing nature of the challenges faced by counsel for the 
corporation.”). 
 265. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 257, at 480–81. 
